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FACTS AND FIGURES ABOUT SOUTH AFRICA1
People
Population: 43,421,000
Ethnic groups: Black 75%, White 13%, Coloured 9%, Indian 3%
Age structure: 0-14-years: 32%, 15-64 years: 63%, 65 years and over: 5%
Religions: Christian 68%, indigenous beliefs 28%, Muslim 2%, Hindu 2%
Official languages: Afrikaans, English, Ndebele, Pedi, Sotho, Swazi, Tsonga, Tswana, Venda, Xhosa,
Zulu
Literacy: 82%
Geography
Area: 1,291,912 sq km
Time zone: GMT + 2h
Capital cities: Pretoria (administrative capital)
Cape Town (parliamentary capital)
Bloemfontein (judicial capital)
Provinces: Eastern Cape, Free State, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, North-West,
Northern Cape, Northern Province, Western Cape
Border countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zimbabwe
Government
Government type: republic
Chief of state: President Thabo Mbeki (since 16th June 1999)
Head of government: President Thabo Mbeki
Legislation: bicameral parliament consisting of the National Assembly (400 seats) and the
National Council of Provinces (90 seats)
Legal system: based on Roman-Dutch law and English common law; accepts compulsory ICJ
jurisdiction, with reservations
Economy
Currency: 1 rand (R) = 100 cents, 1 rand = SEK 1.292
GDP: USD 127 billion, per capita USD 3000 (1999)3
GDP composition: agriculture: 5%, industry: 35%, services: 60% (1999 est.)
Natural resources: gold, chromium, antimony, coal, iron ore, manganese, nickel, phosphates, tin,
uranium, gem diamonds, platinum, copper, vanadium
Industries: mining (world’s largest producer of platinum, gold, chromium), automobile as-
sembly, metalworking, machinery, textile, iron and steel, chemicals, fertiliser,
foodstuffs
Exports: USD 28 billion (f.o.b., 1999 est.)
Export commodities: gold, diamonds, other metals and minerals, machinery and equipment
Export partners: UK, Italy, Japan, US, Germany (1997)
Imports: USD 26 billion (f.o.b., 1999 est.)
Import commodities: machinery, foodstuffs and equipment, chemicals, petroleum products, scientific
instruments
Import partners: Germany, US, UK, Japan (1997)
Labour force: agriculture 30%, industry 25%, services 45% (1999 est.)
Unemployment rate: 30% (1999 est.)
                                                          
1 Source: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sf.html  (2001-06-15), unless otherwise indicated
2 http://www.forex.se 2001-07-09
3 http://www.swedishtrade.se/sydafrika 2001-07-09
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This is an empirical study performed in Johannesburg and Pretoria, South Africa,
during the period of mid October to the end of December year 2000. The Thesis con-
stitutes the Graduate Thesis at the Master of Law Programme at School of Economics
and Commercial Law at the Gothenburg University, Sweden.
The topic of the Thesis is chosen after consultation with Swedish companies active in
South Africa. Our aim was to find a topic within the field of Commercial Law that is of
current interest for business life. Black economic empowerment was pointed out as
one of the most central questions for business within the region at present.
1 INTRODUCTION
Since the first democratic elections in South Africa in 1994, black economic
empowerment has been one of the foremost issues on the government’s agenda.
The government of South Africa recognises that the majority of the people of South
Africa for decades have been deprived of all influence in the society. As a result of dis-
criminatory laws and practices, there are firmly established structures and patterns
that do not vanish simply by repealing discriminatory laws. Black economic
empowerment has a key role in the transformation process aimed at re-balancing the
society after the years of apartheid. It is the government’s policy to actively promote a
more equitable distribution of wealth. This is believed to be necessary in order to se-
cure the newly started democratic process in South Africa.
The government of South Africa promotes black economic empowerment in a num-
ber of ways. Beyond enforcing empowerment through legislative measures, emphasis
is put on how well the business is compatible with the principles of black economic
empowerment when granting State contracts, licences (for example broadcasting,
fishing, casino, radio and cellular telephone licences), and giving financial and other
assistance to business. Therefore, it is critical for all companies, and particularly
companies having dealings with the government in the course of business, to under-
stand the concept of black economic empowerment and its impact on business in
South Africa today.
' Engdahl & Hauki 2001 8
The Thesis is written with the ambition to serve non-South African companies newly
established or in the process of establishing in South Africa. In the Thesis we present
the elements of black economic empowerment which we consider to be the most rele-
vant in order to be well-informed on the topic.
South Africa is a country in transition. To fully understand black economic
empowerment and what it is all about, it has to be placed in South Africa’s historical
context. Therefore, the Thesis starts with a short summary of the situation of the
country in 1994 and what has led it to that position.
1.1 Purpose
Our aim with the Thesis is to provide the reader with a sound basis for the under-
standing of black economic empowerment in South Africa, with an emphasis on the
following questions:
•  What is the essence of black economic empowerment, and what is it meant to
achieve?
•  How does black economic empowerment affect business life in general?
•  How has black economic empowerment been approached by business life?
•  What is the regulatory framework and what are the consequences of non-
compliance?
•  Are there other reasons, beyond complying with the law, to implement black eco-
nomic empowerment policies in business life?
•  What are the future prospects of black economic empowerment?
It is our belief that in order to get a solid understanding of black economic
empowerment, you must be acquainted with not only the aspects that directly influ-
ences your own business, but also to understand the conditions for black businesses.
These will most likely be co-workers in one way or another at some point in time.
Therefore, we will briefly present different empowerment aspects that are relevant
from black entrepreneurs’ point of view as well.
1.2 Delimitations
The concept of black economic empowerment is much wider than the area presented
in this Thesis, covering everything from improving infrastructure in the rural areas to
increasing black ownership on the stock exchange. We will only present the aspects of
black economic empowerment that are relevant for the target group we have chosen.
It is not our ambition to give an overall presentation of the conditions for business in
South Africa. Our ambition is to give a presentation of how the process of black eco-
nomic empowerment affects business life in general. The conditions for, and the
© Engdahl & Hauki 2001 9
varying impact of black economic empowerment in different sectors, will not be spe-
cifically discussed.
1.3 Perspective
It is our belief that black economic empowerment must be taken most seriously. Not
only because a successful restructuring of the society is of outmost importance for
South Africa as a country, but also because, in the long run, we trust it to be in the
best interest of companies active in the country as well.
From our point of view, black economic empowerment is not a separate question that
can be handled over to consultants or company legal councillors. In this Thesis we
will promote that black economic empowerment has to be a vital element in building
up the company, permeate the management and be a fully integrated part of a com-
pany’s policies and strategies for the future. Taking this approach, the understanding
of black economic empowerment is crucial for people in leading positions in corpora-
tions.
The government of South Africa has a firm commitment to black economic
empowerment. This commitment results in, from different groups criticised, inter-
ventions in the market. Given the very specific history of South Africa, we have an
understanding for the need of these interventions. We will present the government
interventions as facts of reality that need to be approached, and we do not have the
ambition to evaluate them as such.
1.4 Method
During our 10-week stay in South Africa we met with and interviewed representatives
from business life, universities, authorities and relevant organisations, in order to get
a broad understanding of black economic empowerment. The interviews served as a
problem orientation and guide into what is most relevant and of interest for the cho-
sen target group. Our further research is based on books, newspapers and magazines.
The interviews were often conducted in a confidential atmosphere and took the form
of personal discussions, with an open exchange of views. Therefore, we will not name
the sources of various opinions that are presented in the Thesis since this in several
cases was a precondition for the openness.
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This method was chosen since we believe that the personal opinions of people in
leading positions are as interesting as, if not more than, the public policies of the or-
ganisations they represent.
1.5 Goals
Our goal is to present a Thesis that can serve as an introduction to and a problem ori-
entation in black economic empowerment for non-South African companies estab-
lished or in the process of establishing in South Africa.
Our hope is that the Thesis will give such an understanding of the empowerment
process that an active decision on how black economic empowerment shall impact the
strategies of a company can be taken. Furthermore, our aim is to initiate the question
on what needs to be done in an organisation to secure the compliance with black eco-
nomic empowerment regulations and policies.
After having read this Thesis, the reader shall also have the basic knowledge needed
to identify unintended conducts that do not comply with the approach chosen by his
or her organisation.
2 CONTEXT
Introduction
This chapter begins with a historical section, where we will focus on the part of the
apartheid legacy that suppressed the Black, Coloured and Asian South Africans’ abil-
ity to participate in the economy and conduct business, as well as acquire skills neces-
sary for this. The deprivation of political rights will not be discussed, as it falls outside
the scope of this Thesis.
We use the political label ‘black’ and thereby refer to the three ‘non-white’ groups of
people, in recognition of their common discriminated status in the apartheid society.
The degree of suppression varied somewhat between the groups.
The chapter continues by presenting the evolution of black economic empowerment,
and concludes by offering a brief international empowerment comparison.
© Engdahl & Hauki 2001 11
2.1 Historical Context
The history of the apartheid state can be described as institutionalised disem-
powerment of the black population. Black South Africans were discriminated against
in employment, skills development, in ownership and control of business as well as in
access to basic social and physical infrastructures.4 They were legally barred from any
political participation. The oppression was extreme, and in many cases basic human
rights were denied.
One of the most important aims of the apartheid legacy was to suppress black entre-
preneurship in order to defend and support the interests of white economy. The
Groups Areas Act decided where black people were allowed to live and the Influx
Control Act denied them the right to move freely around the country. Blacks were re-
garded as temporary residents in the ‘white urban areas’, with the only purpose to
provide labour for white industry and commerce. The Native (Urban Areas) Consoli-
dation Act of 1945 only allowed small businesses, selling the daily essentials of living,
to operate in the urban black townships. The authorities controlled the allocation of
all business sites in the area.5
In 1963 black businesses were further limited by the ‘one-man business’ policy that
was introduced. This policy hindered black people to run more than one business and
prevented them from forming partnerships with the objective of initiating larger
business ventures. The 1963 legislation also blocked the establishment of black-
controlled financial institutions, wholesale businesses and manufacturing industries
in white areas. A decreed in the legislation stating that local authorities, not blacks,
were to erect all buildings necessary for business activities, gave the authorities fur-
ther control over black business. Another policy designed to protect white business
and limit black entrepreneurship was the ‘job reservation’. The job reservation cre-
ated a white monopoly by restricting blacks, until 1979, from jobs in certain skilled
trades and from holding positions above a certain level. This has lead to that the
technical and managerial skills necessary to operate businesses is severely con-
strained in the black population.6
                                                          
4 NALEDI, draft document - The evolution of “Black Economic Empowerment” in South Africa: From the
lenses of business, the tripartite alliance, community groups, and the apartheid and post-apartheid governments
(1985 – 1999), Omano Emma Edigheji, 2000, p 15
5 Abeluleki Consulting, draft document - Towards an Economic Empowerment Strategy in South Africa, 2000,
p 6
6 Abeluleki Consulting, draft document, p 6
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The Bantu Education system, introduced in 1953, deliberately underdeveloped the
capacity of blacks and prepared them for lives of subordination. Science and Maths
were practically excluded from the Bantu Education. The black universities were
structured to mainly produce social scientists, teachers and lawyers. A number of
professions, especially in the natural sciences, were closed to black people and the
vast majority was denied the opportunity of higher education.7
The Land Act of 1913 prohibited blacks from purchasing land outside the ‘native ar-
eas’. The land allocation to the rural population was disproportionately low. This af-
fected black people in many ways. It did not only curtail development of the farming
sector, it excluded them from the financial market by denying them the means to pro-
vide sound security for loans.8
The effect of the apartheid politics was disastrous for black business and for the hu-
man capital essential to self-fulfilment, social development and economic advance-
ment in a modern society. In 1996 these figures were facts;
- Whites, 13 percent of the population, held 80 percent of the professional positions
and 93 percent of management positions in private business.
- Less than 7 percent of South African Ph.D. holders were black. Very few black
South Africans had higher education in Business, Finance, Engineering and the
sciences, as they needed a special government permit to attend white universities
where these skills were taught.
- In 1996 adult literacy in South Africa was about 73 percent, but 80 percent of the
black people were unable to read beyond the fifth grade level. 9
South Africa has one of the most unequal distributions of income in the world. This is
caused by the extremely low levels of black participation in the economy. In 1994, a
black person’s income was 13 percent of a white person’s income. A Coloured person’s
income amounted to 27 percent and an Indian income to 40 percent of a white per-
son’s income.10 For many black people in South Africa the only difference in their ex-
istence today, compared to the era of apartheid, is that their legal status has im-
proved.
                                                          
7 The impact of black economic empowerment initiatives, Accountancy and Finance Update, August 1997
8 Abeluleki Consulting, draft document, p 7
9 Ford, Christopher A., Challenges and Dilemmas of Racial and Ethnic Identity in American and Post-Apartheid
South African Affirmative Action, UCLA Law Review, vol. 43, August 1996, number 6, p 1973ff
10 Women lose out in Africa’s richest nation, The Star, 31 October 2000
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Though the apartheid system has been abolished in South Africa, race and colour still
determine the economic and social structure of the society. President Thabo Mbeki
described the status, year 2000, in the nation like this: “’… South Africa is two nations
in one – one white, affluent and privileged and the other black and disadvantaged.’”11
The previous race ideology, the President pointed out, has led to that distribution of
wealth, income, intellectual resources, land and opportunity for personal advance-
ment are skewed in favour of whites in South Africa. He summarised by stating that
the aim of the whole system was that whites should always remain the dominant
group and the black majority the dominated.12
2.2 The Evolution of Black Economic Empowerment
There is a considerable lack of clarity as to what the concept of black economic
empowerment really is. Different people and constituencies define it in different ways
and assign it different meaning. Consequently, it is important to be aware of who de-
fines black economic empowerment in the discussion.
The definition also varies over time. Black economic empowerment (BEE), Affirma-
tive Action, National Economic Empowerment and Development (NEED) are differ-
ent terms used from the late 1980’s and onwards to describe mainly the same thing.
In the late 1980’s, white business regarded black economic empowerment as a
mechanism to create a black middle class with interests in the economy. The initial
thought was that by partly re-arranging the racial composition of the ownership
structure of the economy, the market economy and political stability would be en-
sured. Corporate social responsibility programmes and black advancement initiatives
were introduced to achieve black economic empowerment. The creation of a small in-
fluential black business class was part of the goal. Blacks were to gain access in to the
formal economy at the same time as the underlying structures of the economy were to
be left unaffected.13 At this time black people were mostly put in middle management
positions without any managerial responsibility.14 The black people that did have
managerial responsibility were mainly taken in of pure business sense. This was when
for example black people were needed to give the company insight into black peoples’
consumption needs and habits.
                                                          
11 A long way towards combating racism, Enterprise, October 2000
12 A long way towards combating racism, Enterprise, October 2000
13 NALEDI, draft document - The evolution of “Black Economic Empowerment” in South Africa, p 6f
14 The impact of black economic empowerment initiatives, Accountancy and Finance Update, August 1997
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The first democratic elections in 1994, when the African National Congress, ANC,
came to power, were a political turning point. Corporate South Africa responded by
appointing black non-executive directors and by selling businesses to black
empowerment groups. Financial institutions provided funding to so-called Special
Purpose Vehicles (SPVs)15, which enabled black people without capital to go into
business.16 At this point, black economic empowerment was largely a function of the
white businesses’ efforts to change themselves.17 Political correctness became very
important in corporate South Africa.
Black economic empowerment was met with suspicion from the black community in
the late 1980’s, as they feared that it would only create a black middle class without
fundamentally transforming the oppressive political system and give full political
rights to all. It was not until in the early 1990’s that ANC converted to the concept of
black economic empowerment. The ANC’s position has thereafter been characterised
by concepts such as de-racialisation and democratisation of the economy and eco-
nomic emancipation of the black majority.18
After the 1994 elections, the ANC-led Government of National Unity (GNU) was fo-
cused on reconstruction and reconciliation. Emphasis was put on economic inclusiv-
ity, aimed at broadening the economic base of South Africa. This was done by pro-
moting small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) and through the Reconstruc-
tion and Development Programme (RDP). Black economic empowerment was on the
government’s agenda from the very beginning, although not as strongly as it is to-
day.19
Black economic empowerment of today can be described as a process aimed at re-
dressing the imbalances in the ownership and control of South Africa’s economic re-
sources by increasing black participation at all levels of the economy. This shall be
done by job creation, poverty alleviation, specific measures to empower black women,
education, skills transfer and management development, meaningful ownership and
access to finance to conduct business.20
                                                          
15 SPVs are presented in chapter 6.2
16 TIPS Annual Forum “Growth and Investment in South Africa”, Johannesburg 21 of September 1999, Panel -
National economic empowerment, http://www.tips.org.za/events/proceedings/bee.html  2001-07-11
17 Empowerment companies no longer there for the picking’, Business Day, 9 May 2000
18 NALEDI, draft document  - The evolution of “Black Economic Empowerment” in South Africa, p 8ff
19 BusinessMap, Empowerment 2000 – New Directions, 2000, (BusinessMap 2000), p 49
20 BEE moves to phase two, Enterprise, October 2000
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Over the years, the government has expanded the parameters of its empowerment
objectives in business to include training, affirmative action, affirmative procurement
and equity ownership. The empowerment requirements vary between different state
departments, agencies and governments on local, provincial or national level. Several
government departments have for example articulated their own policies for
empowerment. Subsequently, it is difficult to determine what aspects of
empowerment that are most relevant in doing business with these public entities.21
Black economic empowerment can also be seen as a way to deepen the economy and
stimulate growth in the country by releasing the economic potential of the black
population.22
Under President Thabo Mbeki’s leadership work has been put in to create a more co-
herent, over-reaching approach towards black economic empowerment. The speed to
enforce change in the South African society has been picked up and empowerment is
becoming a vital part in most of the government’s policies.  The government is now
increasingly using both legislative leverage and its buying power to promote black
economic empowerment.23
The sectors most affected by empowerment are broadcasting, gaming, fishing, IT and
telecommunications, construction, transport, energy, mining, asset management in
the financial services sector, municipal services (including water and sewage provi-
sion), education, health care and the defence industry. Altogether these sectors con-
tributed to the GDP with 38.5 percent in 1998.24
2.3 Empowerment Comparisons25
Black economic empowerment is not a unique phenomenon. Various forms of af-
firmative action have, and are, taking place around the world. In Malaysia, a pro-
gramme similar to the one in South Africa was launched in 1969. South Africa has
learned a lot from their experiences. Likewise, Malaysia is a country where affirma-
tive action targets a majority of the population. Affirmative action is also used to
achieve gender equity in several countries.
                                                          
21 BusinessMap 2000, p 49
22 Need to clean up, Enterprise, May 2000
23 BusinessMap, Empowerment Guidelines for Investors: Mapping state requirements and investor experiences,
2000, (BusinessMap, Empowerment Guidelines), p 4
24 BusinessMap, Empowerment Guidelines, p 7
25 BusinessMap 2000, p 40f
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South Africa’s history makes it unique from other nations where affirmative action
has or is taking place. In South Africa the majority, approximately 87 percent, of the
population has been disadvantaged and is now subject to affirmative action. The
gravity of suppression is also making South Africa unique in that the empowerment
process has to be very extensive.
2.3.1 South Africa
Empowerment has successfully taken place in South Africa before. Starting in 1948,
the Afrikaners26 were subject to economic empowerment. However, the Afrikaners
began their process of economic empowerment from a far better position than blacks
did in 1994. The Afrikaners were on average relatively more educated than the aver-
age black in South Africa and they had the advantage of a major capital base in the
form of land. The labour market was also substantially different from today, with fo-
cus on manual labour force. Another difference is that the growth rates in South Af-
rica of today (2.5% in average since 1994) are much lower than the ones during the
period of 1948-1970 (5% per annum).
2.3.2 United States
In the early 1970’s, shortly after the Civil Rights movement, there was a conscious de-
cision by the government in the United States to create a class of black capitalists. The
government was proactive in trying to create equal opportunities for blacks in em-
ployment, education, housing and business. To facilitate black business development
special government structures were set up for the delivery of loans, grants, and tech-
nical assistance to black entrepreneurs. In government procurement policies special
preferences were granted to black-owned businesses.
The efforts in the United States had a material effect; from 1972 to 1992 the number
of black owned businesses grew from 188,000 to 621,000.
The situation in the United States was significantly different from the one in South
Africa today. Empowerment in the United States was focused on a minority group,
just as the Afrikaners’ empowerment in South Africa was, whereas the now ongoing
empowerment in South Africa has the majority of the population as its target. An-
other difference is the economy; the fiscal resources of South Africa cannot be meas-
ured against the much greater ones of the United States at the time. The United
                                                          
26 Afrikaners, also known as Boers, descend from the Dutch settlers in mid 1600.
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States also had a number of good black universities that produced a well-educated
black managerial and entrepreneurial class.
The economic position of blacks and whites in the United States still, after some 30
years of various initiatives, remains unequal. Affirmative action is now stigmatised as
reverse racism. What South Africa can learn from this is that measures beyond af-
firmative action are needed and that various efforts are required to make real
empowerment progress.
2.3.3 Malaysia
Given the population and income statistics, Malaysia is the most relevant example for
South Africa. In 1969, the Malaysian government launched the New Economic Plan
(NEP), which aimed to eliminate poverty and promote greater economic equality
between the different racial groups. Specifically the Bumiputra (indigenous groups,
principally Malays) were empowered through expanded educational opportunities,
employment quotas and incentives for corporate restructuring. If a non-Malay com-
pany wanted to bid for government contracts, for example, or if they wanted to go
public, they had to restructure the company and 30% of their stocks were to be sold to
Bumiputras at a discount. In order to promote the growth of an industrial and com-
mercial Bumiputra community the government also used the allocation of contracts,
quotas and licenses.
The NEP worked very well in Malaysia for the Bumiputras, which previously were the
disadvantaged group. In 1970 the Bumiputras’ share of corporate equity ownership
was 2.4%. Twenty years later this had risen to 20.3%.
The criticism against the NEP is that the Malay elite is seen to have benefited dispro-
portionately, and the Chinese and Indians, the more successful ethnic minorities, feel
the playing field is stacked unreasonably against them. At the same time Malaysians,
from all ethnic groups, acknowledge that the empowerment focus in the NEP has
helped the country to avoid racial turmoil.
2.3.4 The Current Context
The empowerment initiatives described above have all worked well. Nevertheless, the
prevailing conditions in South Africa today are substantially different. Globalisation,
driven by technological change and economic liberalisation, has reduced a state’s
ability to dictate change in the world of today. The state is much less powerful in rela-
tion to private business or social interests than ever before. This is especially prob-
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lematic given the scale of the challenge, to empower South Africa’s 38.1 million black
people. Not only the fact that it is the majority of the country’s population that needs
to be empowered makes it problematic, the relative starting points are more unfa-
vourable than the other empowerment groups experienced.
3 THE CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND FOR BLACK ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT
Introduction
In South Africa’s new constitution, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
equality is defined as one of the cornerstones of the democracy in the country. At the
same time, the constitution provides for affirmative action measures to be taken. This
can be seen as incompatible. However, according to the framers of the constitution,
affirmative action shall not be viewed as a derogation from the right to equality,
rather it shall be viewed as a means to achieve equality and as part of the right to
equality.27
In this chapter we will present the constitutional ground for the affirmative action
part of black economic empowerment.
3.1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa was adopted in May 1996 and en-
tered into effect in February 1997.
The beginning of the preamble of the Constitution reads as follows: “We, the people
of South Africa, Recognise the injustices of our past; Honour those who have suffered
for justice and freedom in our land; Respect those who have worked to build and de-
velop our country; and Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in
our diversity.” The preamble continues by stating that the Constitution has been
adopted by the people so as to “…[h]eal the divisions of the past and establish a soci-
ety based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights;” and to
“[i]mprove the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person…”
The Constitution is declared in the explanatory memorandum to “… represent the
collective wisdom of the South African people…”
                                                          
27 Madala, T.H., Affirmative Action – A South African Perspective, SMU Law Review, Vol. 52, No 4, Fall 1999,
p 1542
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The equality section of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution makes a specific provi-
sion for the implementation of affirmative action programmes. After having stated
that “[e]veryone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and
benefit of the law ...”28 it continues with “[e]quality includes the full and equal enjoy-
ment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievements of equality, legislative
and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons,
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.”29 Through this the Constitu-
tion authorises measures to be taken which are designed to promote the achievement
of equality.
Affirmative action is also sanctioned in the Constitution’s chapter on Public Admini-
stration, as it states that “Public administration must be broadly representative of
the South African people, with employment and personnel management practices
based on ability, objectivity, fairness, and the need to redress the imbalances of the
past to achieve broad representation.”30 (emphasis added). By stating that the ad-
ministration must be broadly representative of the South African people, it is indi-
rectly stating that affirmative action shall take place. This is further emphasised by
the fairness criteria and the explicit wording that the need to redress the imbalances
of the past shall be taken into account in employment and personnel management
practices in the public administration.
In the Equality section discrimination is prohibited. No one, including the state, may
“unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds,
including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour,
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and
birth.”31 This protection against unfair discrimination is modified in that discrimina-
tion on one or more of the grounds listed “… is unfair unless it is established that the
discrimination is fair.”32 This means that although the criteria listed in terms of non-
discrimination in the Constitution are far more inclusive than in many modern na-
tions, discrimination on fair grounds is in principle permissible.33
                                                          
28 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, chapter 2 section 9 (1)
29 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, chapter 2 section 9 (2)
30 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, chapter 10 section 195 (1) i
31 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, chapter 2 section 9 (3-4)
32 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, chapter 2 section 9 (5)
33 Tummula, Krishna K., Policy of Preference: Lessons from India, the United states and South Africa, Public
Administration Review, Nov/Dec99
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Thus, the question of the legality of affirmative action in South Africa is answered.
Yet, certain questions remain, such as to what degree either law or private-sector pro-
grammes may be undertaken without conflicting with the Constitution’s core princi-
ple of equality. The requirement that discrimination shall be formally determined to
be “fair” in order to be permissible may mean that no affirmative action programme
in South Africa will be Constitutional without receiving a fairly explicit judicial im-
primatur. Therefore, the contours of South African affirmative action jurisprudence
may not become clear for some time.34
4 GOVERNMENT POLICY PROGRAMMES
Introduction
In this chapter two major government policy programmes are presented: RDP, a so-
cio-economic policy framework, and GEAR, a macroeconomic strategy. Together
these two programmes constitute the base for the black economic empowerment
process. To be acquainted with the basic features of these programmes is important
for the understanding of black economic empowerment.
4.1 The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)
The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) constituted the election
manifesto of the African National Congress (ANC) for the elections in 1994.35 It was
the result of consultation within the ANC, its Alliance partners and other mass or-
ganisations.36 After the election it was adopted and supported by all political parties
in the Government of National Unity and the parliament, and it was implemented
through the RDP White Paper in September 1994.37
The RDP is an integrated, coherent socio-economic policy framework, which seeks to
mobilise all the people and resources of South Africa towards the final eradication of
the results of apartheid, the building of a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist fu-
ture. The programme is a vision for the fundamental transformation of the country. It
integrates growth, development, reconstruction, redistribution and reconciliation
into a unified programme.38
                                                          
34 Ford, Challenges and Dilemmas of Racial and Ethnic Identity, p 1968f
35 NALEDI, draft document - The evolution of “Black Economic Empowerment” in South Africa, p 9
36 The Reconstruction and Development Programme – A Policy Framework, preface
37 RDP White Paper, Discussion Document, September 1994, preface 0.2
38 RDP White Paper, 1.1.1 + 1.3.6
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There are six basic principles of the RDP that shall ensure a coherent programme.
The first is that of an integrated and sustainable programme, in order to overcome
the legacy of apartheid. The second principle is that the programme must be a people-
driven process. Peace and security for all, nation-building, the linking of reconstruc-
tion and development and democratisation of South Africa are the other ones.39 In
one sentence it can be presented as: “An integrated programme, based on people,
that provides peace and security for all and builds the nation, links reconstruction
and development and deepens democracy …”40
All the proposals, strategies and policy programmes contained in the RDP are
grouped into five key programmes:
·  Meeting Basic Needs of people, such as jobs, land, housing, water, electricity,
telecommunications, transport, a clean and healthy environment, nutrition, health
care and social welfare.41
·  Developing Human Resources through education in formal institutions, at
workplaces, homes, public work programmes, youth programmes and in rural ar-
eas. Arts and culture programmes as well as access to sport and recreation are also
treated within this key programme. 42
·  Building the Economy. This programme deals with linking reconstruction and
development. Topics such as industry, trade and commerce, resource-based in-
dustries, upgrading infrastructure, labour and worker rights and issues regarding
Southern Africa are being dealt with in this key programme.43 Racial and gender
inequalities in ownership, employment and skills are addressed as serious weak-
nesses in the economy.44
·  Democratising the State and Society. This key programme sets out the role
for the Constitution and Bill of Rights, of national, provincial and local govern-
ment, the administration of justice, the public sector, parastatals, the police and
security forces, social movements and NGOs.45
·   Implementing the RDP. This programme deals with the implementation and
co-ordination of the RDP and the establishment of effective RDP structures, as
well as development of a programme to finance the RDP.46
                                                          
39 RDP White Paper, 1.3.2–1.3.7
40 The Reconstruction and Development Programme – A Policy Framework, 1994, 1.3.8
41 The Reconstruction and Development Programme, 1.4.2
42 The Reconstruction and Development Programme, 1.4.4-5 + 8-9
43 The Reconstruction and Development Programme, 1.4.18
44 The Reconstruction and Development Programme, 1.4.13
45 The Reconstruction and Development Programme, 1.4.20
46 The Reconstruction and Development Programme, 1.4.21 + 23
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The RDP white paper from 1994, dealing with implementation questions, states that
it is essential that the existing ownership patterns become less concentrated. The
participation in the economy needs to increase, become more racially inclusive and
small, medium and micro enterprises must account for a larger part of the economic
activity.47 Therefore, the government sets out to, together with the private sector and
NGOs, to determine appropriate support policies for small and medium-sized enter-
prises.48
The RDP is to be financed through the RDP Fund.49 Resources are drawn from sav-
ings by the departments, international and domestic grant aid, interest earned from
the investments of money standing to the credit of the fund, sale of state assets and
from other sources, such as revenue from lotteries and gambling.50
4.2 Growth, Employment and Redistribution – A Macroeconomic Strategy
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) is a macroeconomic strategy
launched by the government in 1996. It is a strategy for rebuilding and restructuring
the economy, built on the goals set forth in the RDP programme.51 The GEAR strategy
has somewhat displaced the RDP programme’s economic role.
Central for the programme is to increase the economic growth, in order to reverse the
unemployment crisis, provide resources for the expansion in social service delivery
and for progress toward an equitable distribution of income and wealth. The strategy
points out that transformation towards a competitive outward-oriented economy is
required for a sustained growth on a higher level. The GEAR strategy set out a growth
rate of six percent per annum and job creation of 400,000 per annum by the year of
2000.52
The core elements of the GEAR strategy are:
·  budget reform to strengthen the redistributive thrust of expenditure;
·  fiscal reform aimed at reducing the size of the government’s deficit, counter infla-
tion and free resources for investment;
·  a monetary policy to keep the real effective exchange rate stable at a competitive
level and to prevent a resurgence of inflation;
                                                          
47 RDP White Paper, 3.1.4
48 RDP White Paper, 3.10.1
49 Established in terms of the RDP Fund Act of 1994
50 RDP White Paper, 2.3.1-6
51 Growth, Employment and Redistribution – A Macroeconomic Strategy, June 1996, 1.1
52 Growth, Employment and Redistribution, 1.2-3
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·  gradual relaxation of exchange controls and a reduction in tariffs to contain input
prices and facilitate industrial restructuring;
·  an industrial policy with tax incentives to stimulate new investment in competitive
and labour absorbing projects, a flexibility within the collective bargaining system
and a strengthened levy system to fund training;
·  speeding up the restructuring of state assets, in order to optimise investment re-
sources and address service deficiencies and backlogs by an expansionary infra-
structure programme; and
·  an expansion of trade and investment flows in Southern Africa.53
A key element in the government’s strategy for employment creation and income
generation is the promotion of small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs). Vari-
ous programmes and institutions have been established to give effect to this strat-
egy.54 The GEAR strategy seeks to give clear directions to the economic course of
South Africa and aims to build a competitive fast-growing economy.55
The GEAR policy has come under a flood of criticism. Some say that South Africa
needs ‘a change of GEAR’, while others are calling on the government to scrap the
GEAR policy since it has failed in what it set out to achieve, namely to bring economic
growth and create jobs.56
The government’s policies will not be described further, nor analysed in this Thesis.
5 GOVERNMENT TOOLS TO DRIVE EMPOWERMENT
Introduction
This chapter aims at presenting different state initiatives that have introduced an
empowerment component in the course of business. We will concentrate on the gov-
ernment’s usage of its buying power in order to promote black economic
empowerment (BEE). The government’s empowerment activities through licenses,
privatisation and public-private partnership will be dealt with briefly, just to give the
reader an introduction and to help to place the phenomena in the context. The chap-
ter begins with describing the multi-faceted approach that characterises the govern-
ment’s empowerment efforts.
                                                          
53 Growth, Employment and Redistribution, 1.4
54 Growth, Employment and Redistribution, 5.4
55 Growth, Employment and Redistribution, 10
56 Stop-go for GEAR? Enterprise, November 2000
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5.1 Government’s Definition on Black Economic Empowerment
For a company dealing with state entities in the course of its business, it is an essen-
tial but difficult task to elucidate the government’s approach to black economic
empowerment. Whereas there should not be any obscurity about the government’s
objectives with the transformation process overall, the varying emphasis put on
empowerment aspects in different situations can be perplexing.
In the absence of a BEE-blueprint stating the essence of black economic
empowerment, government departments and state entities have developed their own
empowerment conducts. This implies differing empowerment policies between state
departments, governments and agencies on local, provincial and national level.
Empowerment requirements are also enforced with varying emphasis depending on
the procedure in question. This means that the empowerment obligations differ be-
tween, for instance, a licence application at a local authority and a tender procedure
at state level.
To ensure that the government’s approach to black economic empowerment finds
homogeneous expressions, legislation has recently been passed for instance in the
procurement area. However, until uniform procedures are established and followed
throughout the public sector, it will be difficult to determine unambiguously what as-
pects of empowerment are considered most relevant in doing business with public
entities.
Generally, the elements that are most frequently looked at are equity ownership,
management representation, skills development and training as well as small busi-
ness and community support. Usually, bidders for any government contracts have to
show that they have considered empowerment in all these aspects.57
5.2 Preferential Procurement
5.2.1 Background
The government – at national, provincial and local level – is estimated to procure
goods and services at a value of R110 billion each year.58 The procurement budgets of
state owned enterprises are substantial as well, amounting to between R40 and R60
billion.59
                                                          
57 BusinessMap, Empowerment Guidelines, p 10
58 Ramaphosa says black economic empowerment has failed, Business Day, 13 September 2000
59 Ministry of Public Enterprises, An Accelerated Agenda Towards the Restructuring of State Owned Enter-
prises: Policy Framework, 2000, p 73
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In order to take a part of these resources by closing government or parastatal deals, it
is crucial for companies to understand the procurement system and policies as well as
the inducements behind them.
It is not a new phenomenon that the government of South Africa utilises its extensive
buying power to promote political, social and economic objectives. In the late 40’s, as
the National Party came to power, the public tendering system was made use of to
advance Afrikaners’ social and economic position.60 In addition, a kind of preferential
procurement took place during the time of international sanctions, as the tender con-
ditions allowed a 10% premium for local manufacturers.61
After the democratic elections in 1994, there was an urgent need for procurement
strategies that would reflect the objectives stated in the Reconstruction and Develop-
ment Programme (RDP).62 Subsequently, an interim “10-Point Plan”63 on public sec-
tor procurement was introduced in early 1996. The foremost aim of the plan was to
improve small, medium and micro enterprises’ (SMMEs) access to state tenders, for
example by establishing Tender Advice Centres, simplifying the tender documents
and dividing larger contracts into smaller ones.64
To implement the 10-Point Plan and to especially promote SMMEs owned by black
people or women, a price preference system was developed for contracts under R2
millions. According to the evaluation formula, a tender could be awarded up to 88 of
total 100 points for the price. Remaining 12 points were awarded based on the equity
ownership structure of the bidding company; Up to 10 points could be received if the
bidding company was 100% owned by black people (1 point at 10% ownership etc)
and similarly up to 2 points could be received based on the equity owned by women.
Thus, the price premium for a tendering company entirely owned by black women
was up to 13.64% (12/88).65 With other words, such a company could present a ten-
der scoring 76 points for the price and still be competitive with a company scoring 88,
the maximum points, for their price.
                                                          
60 Naledi, Policy Bulletin, Vol. 2., No 4, November 1999, p 5
61 BusinessMap, Empowerment Guidelines, p 11
62 van Niekerk, Tristan A., Enabling Legislation for SMME (Small, Medium and Micro Enterprise) Develop-
ment: Defining the Participants and Administering the Rules in an Affirmative Public Sector Procurement Pro-
gramme, 1998, p 10
63 Procurement Task Team: An Initiative of the Ministries of Finance and Public Works Interim Strategies: Pub-
lic Sector Procurement Reform in South Africa: A 10-Point Plan, November 1995
64 Naledi, Policy Bulletin, p 5
65 Naledi, Policy Bulletin, p 5
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With the adoption of the new Constitution in 1996, the constitutional ground for
preferential procurement was laid. The section on procurement starts with stating
that “[w]hen an organ of state … contracts for goods or services, it must do so in ac-
cordance with a system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-
effective”.66
According to the same section, this does not prevent an organ of state from imple-
menting a procurement policy that provides for
“a. categories of preference in the allocation of contracts; and
b. the protection or advancement of persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged
by unfair discrimination.”67
This is in line with the equality clause in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights, by which
measures may be taken to promote equality.68
To enable an unsuccessful tenderer to verify that his constitutional rights to equal
treatment have been observed during the tender evaluation, the Appeal Court has
ruled that all public bodies, including parastatals, have a constitutional duty to pro-
vide reasons for their decisions.69
The Constitution sets out that national legislation must provide a framework in which
the preferential procurement policy may be implemented.70
The process towards a legislative framework started in April 1997 with the Green Pa-
per on Public Sector Procurement Reform in South Africa. In this extensive discus-
sion document, the government clearly manifests its determination to use its pur-
chasing power to attain specific socio-economic objectives.71
5.2.2 The New Procurement System
After a strongly delayed legislation process, the Preferential Procurement Policy
Framework Act  (Framework Act) was finally passed in February 2000 to give effect
on the Constitution, by providing a framework in which an organ of state must de-
termine and implement its own preferential procurement policy.
                                                          
66 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, chapter 13, section 217 (1)
67 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, chapter 13, section 217 (2)
68 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, chapter 2, section 9 (2)
69 Transnet gets wake-up call on tenders, Business Day, 15 November 2000
70 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, chapter 13, section 217 (3)
71 Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement Reform in South Africa - An initiative of the Ministry of Finance
and the Ministry of Public Works, April 1997, chapter 1
© Engdahl & Hauki 2001 27
Similar to the former 10-Point Plan, the Framework Act propounds a preference point
system to be followed. For contracts with a Rand value above a prescribed threshold,
up to 10 points may be allocated for ‘specific goals’, whilst up to 90 points can be
granted based on the price. For contracts equal to or below the threshold value, spe-
cific goals can score up to 20 out of 100 points.72 Thus, the smaller contracts can be
granted more points for specific goals in order to promote the SMME sector.
According to the Framework Act, the specific goals may include
“(i) contracting with persons, or categories of persons, historically disadvan-
taged by unfair discrimination on the basis of race, gender or disability;
(ii) implementing the programmes of the Reconstruction and Development
Programme …”73
The invitation to submit a tender must clearly specify any specific goal for which
points may be awarded in the procurement process in question.74 Further, a specific
goal must be measurable, quantifiable and monitored for compliance in order to be
adequate for preference point allocation.75
The Minister of Finance may exempt an organ of state from any or all the provisions
of the Framework Act if it should be of importance for national security or in the
public interest. The provisions of the Framework Act may also be deviated from if the
likely tenderers are international suppliers.76
Due to its general character, the Framework Act does define neither the concept of
historically disadvantaged persons nor how their participation in the contracts should
more precisely be evaluated. Further, the settlement of the crucial threshold value is
left for later regulation.77
To give substance to the Framework Act78, Draft Regulations of the Preferential Pro-
curement Policy Framework Act (Draft Regulations) were released by the Depart-
ment of State Expenditure79 in June 2000. The Draft Regulations apply to all organs
                                                          
72 Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act, No 5, 2000, (Framework Act), chapter 2, sections 1 (a) + 1
(b) i-ii
73 Framework Act, chapter 2, section 1 (d) i-ii.
74 Framework Act, chapter 2, section 1 (e)
75 Framework Act, chapter 2, section 2
76 Framework Act, chapter 3, sections (a)-(c)
77 Framework Act, chapter 5, section 1
78 Also called a “disgraceful piece of slipshod work”, Empowerment: wrong message, Finance Week, 4 February
2000
79 Now included in The National Treasury together with the former Department of Finance
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of state, and forbid the application of any preference system not in compliance with
the Framework Act, the Draft Regulations or other legislation.80
The threshold value referred to in the Framework Act is specified in the Draft Regu-
lations to be R2 million. To calculate the price points for a contract with a Rand value
equal to or below 2 million, the following formula must be used:
Preference Point System 80/20:81
                        Pt    -    P min
 80  x     1  -   ––––––––––
       P min
Where Pt = Rand value of tender under consideration
P min = Rand value of lowest acceptable tender
Consequently, the formula for calculating the price points for a contract with a Rand
value above 2 million is:
Preference Point System 90/10:82
                        Pt    -    P min
 90  x     1  -   ––––––––––
       P min
The invitation to submit a tender must stipulate which of these two preference point
systems will be applied to that specific tender. This implies thorough planning and
pre-calculation by the organs of state before each tender procedure. All the tenders
are to be evaluated after the preference point system indicated in the tender docu-
ment, irrespective of whether some of the received tenders have a value that should
imply for the application of the other preference point system. Should all the received
tenders fall within the system not indicated, i.e. have a value equal to or below R2
million where the 90/10 preference point system is stipulated, or consequently a
value above R2 million when stipulating the 80/20 preference point system, the ten-
der must be cancelled and re-invited with the appropriate preference point system
                                                          
80 Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act, No. 5, 2000:Draft Regulations, (Draft Regulations), section 2
81 Draft Regulations, section 5 (1)
82 Draft Regulations, section 5 (2)
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indicated.83
For the purpose of determining preference points, the Draft Regulations define His-
torically Disadvantaged Individuals (HDIs) as including all South African citizens,
“1. who had no franchise in national elections prior to the introduction of
the 1983 and 1993 constitutions;84
2. women; or
3. disabled persons.”85
Equity ownership by these HDIs may entitle for preference points calculated by the
formula
EP
NOP  x   –––––––
                     100
Where NOP = the maximum points awarded for equity ownership by HDIs
EP = the percentage of equity ownership by HDIs within the enterprise.86
However, preference points are not granted for mere ownership of shares, without
control and active involvement in the company’s management and daily business op-
erations proportional to the degree of ownership. A change in the degree of owner-
ship after the closing date of the tender results in the withdrawal of the preference
points. Subsequently, a public company cannot score preference points for HDI-
ownership, due to the changing shareholder structure in such companies.87
As stipulated in the Framework Act, the specific goals that may entitle to preference
points also include implementing programmes outlined in the government’s socio-
economic policy framework RDP, the Reconstruction and Development Programme.
This reference to the RDP goals seems to make the scope for attaining preference
points very broad. Surprisingly, the Draft Regulations do not put forward any princi-
ples to be used when allocating preference points for the promotion of RDP-
objectives.
                                                          
83 Draft Regulations, section 5
84 The 1993 constitution was a interim constitution, negotiated principally between the then-governing National
Party leader F.W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela
85 Draft Regulations, section 1
86 Draft Regulations, section 7 (2) (d)
87 Draft Regulations, section 7 (2) (b)
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Although the current procurement system is blamed for placing too much emphasis
on price, most of the procurement contracts cannot be secured solely with price
points. White companies have had to acclimatise to the new procurement regulations.
In order to be competitive, they have entered partnerships with HDI-owned compa-
nies or changed their ownership profile by bringing in black shareholders. These have
either been employees or people unrelated to the company. Larger companies have
also launched various social responsibility programmes, often with employee training
and community support elements, in order to show commitment to the
empowerment process.
The Draft Regulations provide a formula for calculating preference points, when they
are claimed for on the basis of partnership with companies owned by HDIs. The prin-
ciple is that each partner’s own preference points are taken into account to the same
degree that they will execute the contract. This means that a joint venture between a
100% white male owned company and a 50% HDI-owned company, where the HDI-
company delivers 60% of the contract value, could score 3 preference points within
the 90/10 preference point system (10p x 50% x 60%).88
The government’s procurement procedures have until recently been administered by
a system headed by a national State Tender Board and nine provincial boards. At the
time of writing, there are plans to abolish the tender boards. A major reason for this is
that they have been found to be archaic, cumbersome and prone to corruption.89 In
some provinces, the tender boards are already replaced by procurement committees
within the provincial departments.90
5.2.3 Problems Connected to Procurement
The high amount of state expenditures together with the emphasis put on equity
ownership by HDIs make affirmative procurement one of the government’s most
powerful tools to promote black economic empowerment. At the same time, the eco-
nomical values involved have made abuse of the system lucrative, thus hampering the
empowerment effects.
Due to institutional weaknesses and insufficient monitoring of performance by the
government, the procurement system has left scope for companies to evade the re-
quirements of substantial involvement by the historically disadvantaged persons.
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89 The tender trap, Business Day, 1 March 2001
90 Free State acts to improve tendering, Business Day, 10 May 2001
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Thus, contracts have been won by registering black persons (during the 10-Point Plan
preferably black women, since that scored two additional preference points) as own-
ers in white companies, or setting up a black-owned company to tender on behalf of
the white company, which would then be subcontracted to perform the contract obli-
gations. Further, black persons have seen their opportunity to profit by posing as
‘empowerment’ partners during a tender procedure and then leaving the scene.91
These kinds of token conducts have raised concepts called window-dressing, fronting,
mobile black executives, rent-a-black, rent-a-face etc. The reasons for these conducts
vary, but the common denominator for companies to create an artificial
empowerment profile can be said to be the wish to qualify for government contracts.
The phenomenon is usually associated with procurement procedures, but can also
take place for instance within affirmative action.
The government has been blamed for encouraging window-dressing by focusing on
requirements on HDI-ownership without ensuring that the compliance is adequately
monitored. The Draft Regulations now state that an organ of state may require, at any
time in the tendering process, a bidder to verify its claims for preference points.92 It is
questionable whether this will be sufficient to address the problem, which has given
rise to negative connotations to the empowerment process in its entirety.
5.2.4 Procurement by State Owned Enterprises
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are not regarded as organs of state, wherefore the
Framework Act and the Draft Regulations do not formally apply to them. However,
the government, in its shareholder capacity, raises requirements that the SOEs’ pro-
curement procedures shall comply with the described legislation all the same.93
SOEs, especially the ‘Big Four’ parastatals Eskom (electricity), Telkom (telecommuni-
cation), Transnet (transport) and Denel (defence industry) are known to be commit-
ted promoters of black economic empowerment. For instance, the power group
Eskom doubled its spending on BEE initiatives in year 2000 to R1.9 billion, mainly
through its procurement policies.94
To eliminate fronting and tokenism, these companies have introduced firm practises
to monitor their BEE contracts. Eskom completes a thorough screening every time a
company takes part in a tender procedure, regardless of its earlier contracts with
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Eskom. Should token practises be disclosed, the company is disqualified as a tenderer
and summoned to appear before a disciplinary committee. Transnet seeks to secure
genuine participation from a BEE-company by requiring shareholder certificates and
interviews with the bidding company and its possible partners. Moreover, contracts
are closely monitored, and where a part of a contract has been subcontracted to small
businesses, their progress is followed up.95
To an increasing extent, SOEs pay attention to their suppliers’ procurement proce-
dures and require empowerment elements in their purchase policies. This means that
the sphere that is affected by the parastatals’ affirmative procurement practises is be-
coming wider.
5.3 Licenses and quotas
In sectors such as broadcasting, telecommunication, gaming and fishing, the govern-
ment is enforcing empowerment by incorporating empowerment obligations in the
requirements for licenses and quotas necessary for operation in the field. The bidders
for such licenses and quotas are partly evaluated by their ability to meet
empowerment requirements, relating to levels of ownership by black groups as well
as non-equity-related empowerment factors, such as employment equity and training.
To give an example, the South African Telecommunications Regulatory Authority,
Satra96, applied following evaluation criteria and weightings when the third mobile
network licence was announced in 1999:97
·  Empowerment 25%
·  Technical 13%
·  Business plan and implementation strategy 44%
·  Universal Service 11%
·  Impact on industry and consumers 7%
The scope of the empowerment element was wide, requiring the bidders to give evi-
dence of, among others, ownership by historically disadvantaged groups, job creation,
affirmative action and training commitments as well as community and social re-
sponsibility programmes. Due to the importance given to empowerment aspects and
the high investments required for the licence, expectations on the empowerment ef-
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fect were high.98
These requirements were seen as difficult to manage and critics have called the li-
cence affair a ‘beauty contest’ not based on facts. Suspicions of irregularities and gov-
ernment intervention in the process have attracted much attention in the media and
the outcome was contested by a court process.
Beyond the third mobile network licence affair, there have been a number of flaws
abating license requirements of delivering good empowerment results. Particularly in
the field of fishing where quotas are allocated, we have been told that the
empowerment requirements are often dealt with in a way hardly corresponding with
government’s good intentions; Black SMMEs who have qualified for a quota have sold
their fishing rights further to an established fishing company, thus ruling out the
chance for skills transfer and job creation. Such conduct, known as ‘paper quota’ sys-
tem,99 impedes empowerment from happening and needs to be addressed if the re-
quirements are to be kept.
5.4 Restructuring and Privatisation of State Owned Enterprises
The reconstruction of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) has been an important issue
on the government’s agenda ever since the elections in 1994. The SOEs inherited by
the new government were in many cases not equipped for delivering service to all
South African citizens.
The restructuring of SOEs, often referred to with the narrower term privatisation, is
used by the government as an arena where to enforce its empowerment objectives.
However, the government’s ambition to implement empowerment elements into re-
structuring deals have varied during the last years depending on the strategic nature
of the assets to be restructured. Where non-core assets have been at stake, the
empowerment requirements have been considerable and the bidders have usually had
to find black equity partners in order to qualify for the deal. Whereas when assets
with strategic dimension or important public service function has been concerned,
government’s concern has been to find foreign, financially strong Strategic Equity
Partners (SEPs) with high technology resources and expertise in the field.100 The fo-
cus on the Strategic Equity Partner’s ability to meet the objectives of the specific asset
and to ensure a highly professional delivery has put empowerment requirements low
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down on the priority list. For example, when the government initiated the search for
an SEP into the state telecommunications company Telkom in 1995, there was a fear
that a strong emphasis on empowerment aspects would affect the value of Telkom
adversely. The government therefore did not require the bidders to bring an
empowerment partner into the deal.101
The government’s different approaches to enforce empowerment requirements in re-
structuring of the SOEs have been criticised. The lack of empowerment effect in some
deals where the government has offered stakes to both Strategic Equity Partners and
empowerment investors has been criticised as well. For example, when selling 20% of
The Airports Company of South Africa (ACSA) to Aeroporti di Roma in 1998, another
10% stake was directed to empowerment investors. Hindered by the high prices that
foreign bidders offered and the difficulties to finance the acquisition, only 4.2% of the
shares were transferred to black owners.102
The idea of selling out state assets without any positive empowerment effects ema-
nating from it was politically inconceivable. Therefore, the establishment of a trust
was initiated to secure that black equity ownership is an outcome of privatisation of
any State Owned Enterprise.
5.4.1 National Empowerment Fund Trust
The National Empowerment Fund (NEF) Trust was established in 1998 by the Na-
tional Empowerment Fund Act (No 105, 1998). The Act states that the aim of the
NEF Trust is to redress the inequalities brought about by apartheid. This shall be
done through promotion and facilitation of ownership of income generating assets to
historically disadvantaged persons (HDPs). The HDPs are defined as those persons or
categories of persons, who prior to the new democratic dispensation, marked by the
adoption and coming into force of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa in
1996, were disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on the basis of their race. This
definition also includes juristic persons or associations owned and controlled by such
persons.103
Beyond providing historically disadvantaged persons with the opportunity to become
direct or indirect owners of SOEs, the Trust’s objectives are, among others, to encour-
age and promote saving, investments and meaningful economic participation by peo-
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ple in this target group. Furthermore, the NEF Trust promotes and supports business
ventures pioneered and run by historically disadvantaged persons and promotes the
universal understanding of equity ownership among the HDPs.
To meet these objectives, the NEF Trust is entitled to acquire shares in SOEs that are
being restructured, at a discount of up to 20%.104 Up to the late year 2000, the Trust
had received shares with a nominal value of about R2 billion, most of the value repre-
sented by a 10% stake deriving from the Telkom restructuring in 1997. As the re-
structuring process of SOEs proceeds, the Trust may earmark up to 10% of the shares
in each SOE. This represents a nominal value of between R10-20 billion.105
The assets in the Trust will be distributed to the beneficiaries through three different
investment vehicles:
An investment trust will market affordable investment units, including both SOE-
shares and other investments. The trust has a dual purpose: it provides ordinary peo-
ple with the chance to be shareowners, and educates them to understand the mecha-
nisms of an equity market.106
A portfolio trust will be set to hold the shares until they can be sold to HDPs seek-
ing a direct shareholding in these SOEs.107
To encourage entrepreneurship and to address the scarce access to financing, an eq-
uity management fund is prepared for providing HDPs with venture capital. The
fund aims to take into account the HDPs’ special conditions that have a historical ba-
sis, and does thus, for example, not require extensive business records from the loan
applicants.108
The start-up phase for the NEF Trust has been long, and it was not until in April 2001
that the first CEO of the fund was appointed.109 Therefore, it is too early to judge
whether the NEF Trust will become “… one of the most significant investment entities
in the South African financial markets …”110 as envisaged by the government.
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5.4.2 Restructuring as a BEE-Tool Today
Government’s current approach to the restructuring of the SOEs is presented in a
Policy Framework111 from August year 2000. The benefits of the restructuring process
are believed to be distributed more effectively through new, creative and diverse
empowerment strategies. Hence, the Policy Framework proposes a multi-dimensional
approach to empowerment through three kinds of empowerment elements in the
SOE restructuring processes:
·  The NEF Trust’s role as a tool to broaden ownership is emphasised. It is ex-
pected to play an important role in promoting empowerment options by pro-
viding different kinds of equity schemes for those previously excluded from
mainstream economic participation. Guidance shall be sought from interna-
tional experiences of collective investment vehicles, in order to avoid the
problems in existing empowerment-related financial engineering.112
·  While increasing ownership of SOEs remains a crucial element of
empowerment, the government is also enforcing operational
empowerment to ensure that a broader part of the HDPs is reached by the
empowerment strategies. Operational empowerment implies for a wide range
of active participation in industries affected by the SOE restructuring, from ac-
cess to training and skills development to improving entrepreneurial opportu-
nities through outsourcing, partnerships, affirmative procurement and access
to financing.113
·  Finally, Employee Share Ownership Plans (ESOPs) and community
trusts (such as producer and consumer co-operatives and non-profit organi-
sations) are being considered as alternative empowerment tools in the re-
structuring process. 114
5.5 Public-Private Partnerships
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) has been generated from the recognition that the
government alone cannot meet South Africa’s increasing development challenges. In
order to generate economic growth, provide infrastructure and deliver services, the
government needs to complement its capacity with the private sector’s strengths and
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abilities.115
The government’s PPP policy is manifested in three key documents:
·  Strategic Framework for Delivering Public Services through Public-Private
Partnerships
·  Treasury Regulations116
·  Guidelines for Public-Private Partnership117
Due to the wide range of PPP variations and the fact that PPP arrangements were
practised before the regulative framework emerged, there has been some confusion
regarding what constitutes PPPs. Treasury Regulations now define PPP as a contrac-
tual arrangement whereby a private party performs a departmental function for a
specified time against remuneration together with a substantial transfer of risk to the
private party.118
The nature of services or functions that different departments perform in public in-
terest is diverse. Therefore, a PPP arrangement can relate to everything from a 1-year
facility maintenance service contract to a 30-years concession, where the contractor
manages, operates, maintains and invests in a new airport, road etc. Common to
PPPs of different character is a substantial transfer of risk to the private party, ena-
bling the department to shift its focus from providing the service to managing the
contract with the service provider.119
The way in which empowerment specifically shall be emphasised within the scope of a
PPP cannot be concluded from the policy framework. However, in practise a PPP
project often involves empowerment requirements, which a potential service provider
has to meet in order to win the contract. The required empowerment elements again
depend on the nature of the contract. For example, in construction industry, empha-
sis is typically placed on employment and training involving the local communities.120
PPPs contribution as an empowerment deliverer is still to be shown. Without regu-
lated empowerment requirements, though, the government’s interest of delivering
cost effective and efficient service to communities might take precedence over some-
times contradictory empowerment ambitions.
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6 THE FINANCING OBSTACLE
Introduction
The government’s focus on delivering empowerment, especially through its procure-
ment and licence practises, gave a strong impetus for partnerships between black
companies, who wanted to take part in the mainstream operations, and white compa-
nies, seeking to adjust their company status to the new requirements. The emergence
of such partnerships through ordinary market practises was restrained due to the
black partners’ lack of access to capital.
In this chapter, we will describe the broadly applied solution to this problem, the so-
called Special Purpose Vehicle. After discussing new approaches to finance
empowerment deals, the chapter will be concluded with a short introduction to the
government’s financing initiatives aiming to address the problem.
6.1 Financing of Empowerment Deals
A major obstacle facing the early BEE-initiatives attempting to transfer ownership
into black hands was the lack of access to capital by the black population. In the cli-
mate where established businesses felt pressure to support black business initiatives,
various creative solutions were found.
Particularly during the first years of empowerment, artificial control tools such as
convoluted pyramid company structures and the issuance of so-called N-shares oc-
curred. By issuing low-voting N-shares to investors, owners of an empowerment
company could raise capital without diluting their own control over the company.
These methods ensured the appearance of black control that did not always reflect
economic realities.121
Black investors, without the financial means needed, were offered to buy shares in
white companies that were seeking to change their ownership profile. Financial in-
stitutions, such as investment bankers, retirement funds and insurance companies,
facilitated the ownership transformation process by starting to provide various finan-
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cial instruments, of which the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) would become most fa-
voured.122
6.2 SPV – Special Purpose Vehicle
An SPV is a special purpose company established by a ‘BEE-company’, with the pur-
pose to facilitate the purchase of an equity stake in a ‘target company’. There is no
unambiguous legal definition of what constitutes a BEE-company (also referred to as
an empowerment company). Therefore, the level and form of involvement by black
persons required for an empowerment status vary from case to case. The target com-
pany can either be a company listed on JSE Securities Exchange SA or a private com-
pany, interested in selling an equity stake to a black partner.123 The impetus behind
this interest is often the target company’s eagerness to appear politically progressive
and to qualify for government contracts that put requirements on the bidder’s
empowerment status. Hence, the shares in the target company are not seldom offered
at a 10-20 % discount of the current market price.124 The incentive for a financier to
become involved in the empowerment deal is, apart from being regarded as politically
correct, to get access to large stakes (usually 10-30%) in coveted companies, not
available without partnership with a black company.125
The BEE-company raises the required means to fund the deal partly through a loan
from the financiers, partly by issuing preference shares in the SPV to them. The BEE-
company holds 100% of the ordinary shares in the SPV and therefore controls the
votes.126
              Ordinary shares                       Preference shares
            10-30%
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The preference shares are redeemable in three to five years. In the meantime, the
preference shares entitle the financier to a determined dividend rate from the SPV,
normally expressed as a percentage (usually 60-65%) of the prime lending rate.127
Any equity performance achieved over and above this dividend rate is shared between
the BEE-company and the financier. The SPV financing structure places most of the
economic benefit on the financier as the owner of the preference shares. However, as
all the funding comes from the financier, he assumes all the downside risk as well.128
The terms of an SPV vary from case to case, but the basic philosophy behind the
structure is the belief that the target company’s earning potential and share price will
increase due to the achievement of an empowerment status and the black group’s
participation. The structure relies on a bullish market with rising share values and
low interest rates, enabling the BEE-company to repay the borrowed funds by selling
a part of its shares as the term of the SPV becomes due.
6.2.1 The Effect of the Market Crisis in 1998
During the first two-three years, the positive market expectations were generally met
and the SPV seemed to be a real success story for all the parties involved. However,
due to the crisis on the Asian market in 1998, the market turned bearish and the in-
terest rates shot up. The dividends from the target company became insufficient to
serve the dividend rate, which lead to that the payments due were added to the loan
capital. This happened at a time when many preference shares were about to be re-
deemed. If the BEE-company could not raise cash elsewhere, it had to relinquish a
portion or even all of its shares in the SPV to the financier in order to settle the
debt.129 In several cases, the BEE-companies were not able to meet their financial ob-
ligations, thus loosing the newly acquired assets as well as causing substantial losses
for the financiers.130
6.2.2 Critique on the Model
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SPV as a mechanism to finance black companies’ share acquisitions has met harsh
criticism after the market crisis in 1998. It has been called financial engineering, not
resulting in real, sustainable empowerment due to evident weaknesses in the struc-
ture. Some of the weaknesses are:
·  The black company’s ownership in the underlying investment is based on debt.
Even in the best-case market scenarios, the model implies that the black company
would have to give up a part of its ownership in order to meet the financial re-
quirements at the end of the term. This has resulted in that several BEE-
companies have exited an SPV with no or strongly diluted ownership in the un-
derlying investment. Consequently, the structure does not contribute to real
transfer of ownership to black hands.131
·  As a result of the SPV being ‘one step away’ from the target company’s daily op-
erations and that the ownership stake seldom exceeds 20 percent, the BEE-
group’s ownership is limited to one or few board seats. Therefore, it is said that
the ownership does not give the black group a chance to a meaningful influence on
the executive and operational level in the target company.132
·  The participation in an SPV does not require any risk-taking from the black com-
pany. With everything to gain, black companies have been eager to close as many
SPV deals as there are. This has resulted in BEE-groups acquiring corporate inter-
ests in various sectors, lacking the strategic and operational focus normally re-
quired from an ownership portfolio and with little attention to adding value to the
investments.133
·  The SPV structure separates control from the economical risk, thus not reflecting
fundamental business principles.
·  The incentives behind the target company to find a black partner have in a num-
ber of cases been to get a politically correct ownership structure and to secure
further government contracts. This has negatively affected the interest to carefully
choose the right empowerment group as a partner and to support skills transfer
during the partnership.
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·  The success of an SPV mechanism relies on absolute rather than relative perform-
ance of the target company. The performance is not benchmarked on earnings or
share price compared to its peers on the market, but on the target company’s ab-
solute share price performance.134
Today, these inherent weaknesses in the SPV model seem obvious and it is easy to
criticise the financial institutions for initiating the SPVs and similar artificial funding
mechanisms that do not help the black companies to create a sustainable capital base
of their own. Still, the financial institutions’ role in black economic empowerment has
been important, BusinessMap135 argues in its annual report on black empowerment.
They enabled the ‘capitalist without capital’ to become a part of the corporate estab-
lishment and to take the first steps towards a balanced ownership structure in SA.136
Even if it has been recognised that this ownership transfer seldom was sustainable,
there has been successful empowerment deals financed through SPVs as well. How-
ever, the turbulent market situation in late 1998 made the shortcomings connected
with the SPV model visible, and since then this financing method has become less
popular. Still, the key question on how to finance empowerment deals remains.
6.2.3 New Approaches
During the past two years, financial institutions have had to reconsider their role in
the empowerment process and come up with new working financing solutions. Ac-
cording to BusinessMap, two different directions can be recognised having emerged
from the finance crisis.137
Reworking the SPV-Model
The first type of response has aimed to rework the traditional financing mechanisms
such as the SPVs. It is believed that these kinds of funding arrangements have not yet
played out their role, but that they need to be adjusted in order to prevent the nega-
tive consequences from reoccurring. One initiative has been to create a secondary
market for the SPVs, thus alleviating the reduced liquidity for the financier during the
SPV contract. There have been indications that this can become a viable option for
both financiers and the empowerment companies.138
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Another major flaw in the SPV structure was the askew risk allocation on the finan-
cier alone. It is argued that in order to ensure the BEE-company’s interest in active
participation as a shareholder, there should be something more to loose than just the
BEE-company’s time invested. Subsequently, financiers have started to require some
financial input from the BEE-company into the SPV-deal. The input can be of limited
importance as security for the loan, but significant enough for the BEE-company to
ensure that proper business principles are brought in to the deal. It has also been ini-
tiated that a BEE-company’s involvement in various SPVs should not continue to be
ring-fenced, meaning that assets in one SPV in the future shall be able to be claimed
for debts accrued in another SPV.139
Financiers are also searching for ways of passing some of the risks onto the target
company, for example by demanding the target company to guarantee the financing
offered to the BEE-company. This is believed to strengthen the target company’s in-
volvement in the process, especially when it comes to choosing the right
empowerment partner and to clarify its objectives with the deal.140 However, the tar-
get companies’ participation must be designed in a way that respects the section 38 of
the Companies Act, which prohibits a company to financially assist the purchase of
shares in the company itself.141
Creating New Solutions
The second direction can be described as a new approach towards financing
empowerment deals. It emphasises sustainable long-term deals between sound com-
panies, whose contributions are clearly defined and measured before entering the
partnership.142 Investments in passive holding companies belong to the history ac-
cording to this approach. Access to financial means is only given to those black com-
panies that demonstrate strong strategic focus, commitment for operational involve-
ment in their investment and preparedness to share the risks.143 Further, financiers’
interest is increasingly drawn towards BEE-companies that have emerged by building
an operational business from the ground, instead of having acted merely as an in-
vestment holding company without an operational track record.144 The financiers also
insist on sophisticated corporate governance in the BEE-company. They require de-
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veloped reporting mechanisms, appropriate information disclosure and remuneration
based on performance. These issues were often neglected during the first eager years
of empowerment.145
Regardless of whether financial institutions prefer funding instruments based on a
modified type of SPV or new solutions, their current approach can be described as
emphasising the integration of sound business principles with empowerment deals.
We believe that the new approach to support empowerment deals is to be welcomed.
It will probably be successful in correcting the asymmetrical risk-return profile and
remuneration not linked to performance, characteristic for the early financing models
and rule out the possibilities to easy gains without any risk and active involvement.
However, the first years of empowerment have not yet changed the historical fact that
there is scarcely any accumulated black capital available to back new business initia-
tives. If the black peoples’ different conditions are ignored when granting financial
help, the entry barriers into the economic sphere can become too high for new black
business initiatives.
6.3 Government Financing Initiatives
The scarcity of black capital was early recognised by the government to choke the
empowerment process. To address this issue and as a part of its national strategy to
promote the SMME-sector, government introduced new institutions with the aim to
increase black entrepreneurs’ access to financing:
Khula Enterprise Finance was established in 1996. Its main objective is to pro-
vide loans to SMMEs through a network of financial retailers. These are banks, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and provincial development corporations. Other
products consist of credit guarantees to secure SMMEs loans, and granting of seed
loan and capacity building for new financial retailers.146
Ntsika Enterprise Promotion Agency was established by the Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI) in 1995. Through support, managerial development and
programme funding, it aims to increase local and provincial SMME Service Providers’
ability to deliver non-financial support to SMMEs.147
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Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) was originally established in 1940
as a state owned corporation. Its mission is to promote industrial development
through a wide range of financing facilities for new and existing projects.148 It has
been restructured to serve government’s empowerment objectives and is now, among
others, providing financial help to emerging entrepreneurs in the industrial busi-
nesses through its Entrepreneurial Finance programme.149
To give black entrepreneurs access to capital is also one of the objectives of govern-
ment’s major initiative National Empowerment Fund (NEF).150
7 THE DIFFERENT PHASES OF EMPOWERMENT
Introduction
In the last years, a dynamic empowerment process has taken place, in which it is pos-
sible to distinguish different phases with their own, characteristic features. It is not
feasible to unambiguously define the nature and duration of an empowerment phase.
Whereas some people are debating the fourth, or even the fifth generation of
empowerment, the majority holds the view that the empowerment process is today
shifting over to its third major phase. In this chapter, our aim is to give the reader a
general picture of the most characteristic features in the two empowerment waves up
to present, whereas the future prospects are discussed in chapter 11.
7.1 The First Phase of Empowerment
To understand the early years of empowerment, you have to be acquainted with the
general atmosphere in South Africa after the first democratic elections in 1994. The
new government was committed to deliver wealth to the neglected majority of the
population. The corporate sector was eager to show acceptance to the new order,
wishing to thereby prevent turbulent development in the economic sector. Without a
framework stating the objectives of the transformation process, empowerment initia-
tives emerged from both private and public actors in a non co-ordinated and confused
manner.
The first phase of empowerment was characterised by a deal making frenzy. Focus
was on acquisition rather than the creation of wealth. Artificial financing structures,
such as Special Purpose Vehicles, SPVs, paved the way for black equity ownership in
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white companies, playing the politically correct game and looking for an
empowerment label to meet the new requirements for government contracts.
The SPV-structures encouraged black consortia to participate in a sophisticated form
of gambling, where the risk to loose was entirely placed on the financiers. To enhance
the prospects to win, black companies started to run over each other to secure as
many SPV-deals as possible. In many cases, this implied lack of focus and passive
ownership of shares with no operational participation. The ‘blackness’ behind an
empowerment company was in many cases questionable. Tempted by the discounted
access that empowerment companies had to white-owned companies looking for an
empowerment partner, the label of black control could be created through excessive
divergence in voting rights or complex pyramid structures.151 It was not exceptional
either to exercise pure window-dressing to secure the ‘empowerment’ status of a
company.
The strong focus on equity transactions limited the empowerment effect to a small
group of black people, a group that was already better off economically than the aver-
age black South African. Therefore, the designation ‘enrichment process’ has said to
more correctly illustrate the character of the first phase of empowerment.
Between July 1996 and July 1998, the market capitalisation of black-controlled firms
on the JSE Securities Exchange rose from R7 billion to R67.8 billion, corresponding
to a rise from 0.7% to 6% of the JSE market capitalisation.152 The celebration of black
companies’ success on the JSE was interrupted by the market crisis in late 1998.
Share prices went down dramatically, the collapse of the Rand sent interest rates up
and the lack of substance behind ownership based on debt was revealed. Political cor-
rectness went out of the window as the structural weaknesses of the early
empowerment deals were exposed and revised the attitude to the SPV-structure as an
appropriate empowerment tool.153
7.2 The Second Phase of Empowerment
Lessons from the market crisis revealed that there are no short cuts to genuine
empowerment. It gave an impetus to redefine the concept of black economic
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empowerment and gradually led to the present phase, called the second phase of
empowerment, where there is emphasis on active and committed operational in-
volvement instead of mere equity ownership.
After the first impatient wave, second generation empowerment can be described as a
slower, but a more meaningful transformation process aimed to give empowerment
companies a substantial and permanent role in the economy. Operational control,
adding value and internal affirmative action policies are the keywords in this phase of
empowerment.
Many black empowerment companies have been structured as unfocused investment
holding companies. This was overlooked by the market during the first years, since
partnership with black empowerment companies brought access to government ten-
ders and privatised assets. This has now changed. With an increasing number of
empowerment companies, ‘blackness’ does not provide an edge anymore. To be of
interest, black empowerment companies have to be focused, add value to their in-
vestment and have a good reputation.154 As Jakes Gerwel, former adviser to South Af-
rica’s former president Nelson Mandela has expressed it, “[b]lack empowerment
companies are no longer ‘just black cherries that can be picked and put on top of
something’…”155
Financial institutions are increasingly talking of a bottom-up approach and are losing
interest to finance unfocused empowerment conglomerates.156 Thus, the new
empowerment companies concentrate increasingly on start-up operations and prac-
tise direct control of investments and subsidiaries. Subsequently, the first-generation
empowerment companies have been forced to show clear focus by selling off non-core
investments in order to be attractive to investors.157
During the first years, which were dominated by SPV-structures, financial institutions
took on a disproportionate amount of risk and reward compared to their
empowerment partners. As the lack of capital remains a serious obstacle to
empowerment deals, SPV-like financing solutions still exist to some extent. Never-
theless, a more appropriate allocation of risk and rewards is seen as crucial.158
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During the first phase of empowerment, the presence on JSE Securities Exchange was
seen as the ruling measure of success or failure of empowerment companies. It is still
an important benchmark of empowerment, but there is a growing realisation that
formal control does not necessarily bring true empowerment. The emphasis is shift-
ing from passive investment companies towards full-time involvement at operational
level, where value adding and skills transfer can take place. Thus, the equity control
on the stock exchange is no longer seen as ‘the Holy Grail of empowerment’.159
An increasing number of successful empowerment transactions involving unlisted
companies have contributed to shift the focus away from the JSE, as well. The stock
exchange is still a potent and very visible symbol of economic power though, and the
process of black empowerment will not be complete until there is substantial black
ownership of JSE-listed shares.160
Ownership of shares, either in listed or unlisted companies, is no longer perceived to
be the only and most appropriate deliverer of sustainable empowerment. The second
phase of empowerment has seen the apartheid attitude ‘big is beautiful’ fade, and
there is an increasing emphasis on the promotion of SMMEs and empowerment on
grass-root level. It is now believed that job creation, skills transfer and broad-based
true empowerment must come from the small, entrepreneurial companies.161
8 BLACK ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT COMMISSION
Introduction
Since its establishment, the Black Economic Empowerment Commission (BEE Com-
mission) has drawn a great deal of attention in the South African media. In most
cases where the state of black economic empowerment has been discussed, reference
has been made to the Commission and its ongoing research in the field. The BEE
Commission has recently completed its work. The Commission’s recommendations
are likely to have an influence on the government’s future empowerment efforts, as
well as affect the public debate on the subject. Therefore, it is important to be ac-
quainted with the BEE Commission and the major conclusions of its research work.
8.1 The Establishment of the BEE Commission
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The establishment of the Black Economic Empowerment Commission was initiated in
November 1997 at a conference held by the Black Management Forum (BMF), an in-
dependent non-governmental organisation supporting the development of manage-
rial leadership and transforming of organisations.162 On the conference, concerns
were raised about the weaknesses and inadequacies in the BEE process. It was recog-
nised that the empowerment process had been left to be conceptualised, controlled
and driven by the private sector, from which the black people and women still were
essentially excluded.163
The BEE Commission was formally established in May 1998 by the Black Business
Council, an umbrella body representing 12 black business organisations, whereof
BMF is one. The mandate given to the Commission was to investigate the success of
the BEE progress thus far, to identify possible barriers in the process and to make
recommendations for the future.164
Thus, the objectives set by the BEE Commission were:
·  “To gain insight into the BEE process through empirical research and to make ob-
servations on the pace and results of BEE initiatives during the 1990’s.
·  To reach conclusions on the obstacles to meaningful participation of black people
in the economy.
·  To develop a powerful case for an accelerated National BEE Strategy and to make
recommendations on policies and instruments required to guide a sustainable
strategy.
·  To develop benchmarks and guidelines to monitor the implementation of the Na-
tional BEE Strategy.” 165
The BEE Commission’s work has been headed by Cyril Ramaphosa, who was ANC’s
chief negotiator with the former South African regime when the apartheid rule was
ended. He was thereafter elected chairman of the Constitutional Assembly, which de-
livered South Africa’s new Constitution in 1996. Ramaphosa, by many expected to
succeed Nelson Mandela to head the ANC, left the political arena for private sector in
1996, and is today a prominent businessman.166
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After conducting extensive research and consultations with stakeholders and experts
from different sectors, the BEE Commission released a discussion document that was
debated at the National Consultative Conference in September 2000. The BEE Com-
mission’s final report was handed over to President Mbeki in April 2001.167
8.2 The BEE Commission’s definition of BEE
The fundamental concept that formed the base for the BEE Commission’s research
work was that a substantial increase of the levels of black participation in the econ-
omy is indispensable in order to attain growth.168 The Commission’s definition on
what constitutes black economic empowerment is:
·  “It is an integrated and coherent socio-economic process.
·  It is located within the context of the country’s national transformation pro-
gramme, the RDP.
·  It is aimed at redressing the imbalances of the past by seeking to substantially and
equitably transfer and confer the ownership, management and control of South
Africa’s financial and economic resources to the majority of its citizens.
·  It seeks to ensure broader and meaningful participation in the economy by black
people in order to achieve sustainable development and prosperity.” 169
Accordingly, the BEE Commission argues that BEE should be broadly viewed, in-
cluding among others:
- job creation
- rural development
- urban renewal
- poverty alleviation
- specific measures to empower black women
- skills and management development
- education
- meaningful ownership
- access to finance for households and for conducting business.170
In its research the BEE Commission states, that seven years after the implementation
of a transformation programme, which aims at fundamentally changing South Af-
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rica’s political, economic and social landscape, the country’s economic growth per-
formance remains weak. The BEE Commission emphasises that structural distortions
in the economy, as well as ingrained racism across all sectors of the society, preserve
the marginalisation of the black majority. The subsequent result is high levels of un-
employment and one of the most unequal distributions of income in the world.171
In order to break out of this cycle of underdevelopment and to launch the country
onto a course of economic growth, the BEE Commission calls for a fundamental shift
in the approach from all sectors of society. It argues for an adoption of a coherent and
Integrated National BEE Strategy as a national imperative.172
The purpose with an Integrated National BEE Strategy would be to create a co-
ordinated set of guidelines and regulations that manifest the priorities and targets for
the economic transformation process and the different stakeholders’ roles and obli-
gations within this process. 173
According to BEE Commission, the moral and political legitimacy for implementing
such an Integrated BEE Strategy is to be found in the former legacies of colonialism,
apartheid and the deliberate disempowerment of the majority of South Africa’s
population.174
8.3 The BEE Commission’s recommendations175
The BEE Commission proposes the Integrated National BEE Strategy to include the
following key components:
·  A National black economic empowerment Act, which would define BEE
and set uniform guidelines against which the public and private sector can meas-
ure their performance and use when implementing BEE. In order to address mar-
ket failures and to transform existing government institutions, the BEE Act should
also provide for the establishment of
·  A permanent National Empowerment Commission within the office
of the President of South Africa
·  A National Procurement Agency aimed at transforming the procure-
ment environment in the public as well as in the private sector
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·  A National Empowerment Funding Agency with the aim to rational-
ise existing government funding initiatives (for instance Khula and Ntsika)
and increase the access to capital among black entrepreneurs
·  A Rural Development Agency to raise funds for land acquisition and
rural infrastructure development
·  Uniform definitions to determine a company’s empowerment status to
be applied by the public and private sector. For instance, within affirmative pro-
curement practises a company’s BEE-rating would determine the awarding of set-
asides and price preferences:
·  A ‘black company’ is 50.1% owned and managed by black people. Rating
for accreditation purposes: A, allowing the company to qualify for set-
asides and a 15% price preference.
·  A ‘black empowered company’ is 25.1% owned and managed by black
people. Rating: B, allowing it to qualify for set-asides and a 10% price pref-
erence.
·  A ‘black influenced company’ is 5-25% owned and managed by black
people. Rating: C, price preference 5%.
·  An ‘engendered company’ is one with 30% representation of black
women within the black ownership and management portion. This gives an
additional 5% price preference, for example an ‘engendered black company’
is entitled to 20% price preference, an ‘engendered empowered company’
to 15% etc.
·  Government, labour and business should reach an agreement on an Investment
for Growth Accord describing the parties’ obligations to invest in areas of na-
tional priority and thereby increase the country’s fixed investment levels and
promote economic growth. For example, Government Employees Pension Fund
should invest 10% of its assets in productive investments within areas of national
priority. Obligations to invest a certain percentage of the total assets should also
be imposed on the financial sector, particularly life and retirement companies.
·  A Commercial Equity Act to facilitate de-racialisation of business practises and
ownership
·  An Empowerment Framework for Public Sector Restructuring defining
principles to be followed in the restructuring process
·  An Integrated Human Resources Development Strategy.
© Engdahl & Hauki 2001 53
8.4 Critique on the BEE Commission and its recommendations
As earlier described, the BEE Commission was established with the task to define
black economic empowerment and make recommendations for the future
empowerment process. After the commission’s work has been considerably delayed, it
has been criticised to let the urgent issue of empowerment slip away from the na-
tional agenda. The slow delivery of the awaited results have been described as taking
on ‘biblical proportions’176 and raised speculations on whether the delay has been
caused by some commissioners in order to serve their own agendas.177
As the final report was released in April year 2001, its compromising and unspecified
nature seems to have been a disappointment for those awaiting clear and tangible
guidelines for the future development of BEE. It has also been stated that more than
two-thirds of the BEE Commission’s proposals are already in various stages of im-
plementation.178 This has probably been caused by the fact that the government has
not been represented in the Commission.
However, the report is clear on calling for a strong and intervening government to
drive the empowerment process through the promulgation of the BEE law and crea-
tion of several new institutions. The government has objected to this excessive reli-
ance on state delivery and means that black economic empowerment can only ad-
vance through co-operation between government, business and labour.179 Some of the
BEE Commission’s comprehensive proposals for new laws and special structures for
BEE have also been questioned. The government has argued that many of the issues
raised can be addressed within the existing legislative and institutional framework if
they are given time to prove their ability to deliver empowerment.180
In its final report, the Commission urges the private sector to recognise its collective
responsibility to assist government in the empowerment process. Yet, the Commis-
sion’s strong emphasis on the government’s active role can give an opposite effect, as
it can be used as an excuse by the established (white) business, not to take an active
part in the transformation process.
The BEE Commission’s proposal for fixed investment levels (also known as pre-
scribed asset requirements), forcing institutional investors to hold a certain percent-
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age of their assets in designated empowerment investments, is seen as the most con-
troversial recommendation. Even if the requirement for fixed investment levels is
planned to be limited to 5-7 years, it is regarded as a major state intervention in an
area that should be left to the market mechanisms. The fear is that it will distort the
relationship between risk and return and lead to misallocation of scare resources.181
Furthermore, there is a question on who would decide what qualifies as ‘productive
investment’ within areas of national priority.182
The BEE Commission has been criticised to not have dealt with the lack of skills
among black people. It has been argued that this issue should be considered before
placing comprehensive requirements on businesses, in order to avoid that they will
resort to token conducts that characterised the first years of empowerment.183
The BEE Commission’s goal to become a permanent, statutory body is also ques-
tioned. Placed within the bureaucracy of a statutory commission, black economic
empowerment would risk becoming an issue outside the mainstream.184
9 LABOUR LAWS
Introduction
As a result of apartheid and other discriminatory laws and practices, there are dis-
parities in employment, occupation and income, which create a pronounced disad-
vantage for certain categories of people. According to the government’s point of view,
this status cannot be redressed simply by repealing discriminatory laws. Conse-
quently, they have sought to influence the workplace through a variety of legislative
means.185 Below we offer a presentation, as well as some critique, of these laws.
9.1 Employment Equity Act (No 55 of 1998)
The purpose of the Employment Equity Act is to achieve equity in the workplace by
promoting equal opportunity and fair treatment in employment. Affirmative action
measures are implemented to redress disadvantages in employment experienced by,
so-called, designated groups. The objective of the Act is to ensure equitable repre-
sentation in all occupational categories and levels in the South African workforce.186
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The Act requires so called designated employers, discussed below, to implement af-
firmative action measures for people from designated groups. Designated groups are
defined as ‘black people’ (which in this Act is used as a generic term for Africans, Col-
oureds and Indians), women and people with disabilities.187
The Act puts certain requirements, such as the anti-discrimination clauses, to all em-
ployers. Other clauses, more specifically the affirmative action clauses, only apply to
the so-called designated employers, except where otherwise is provided. Therefore, it
is necessary to clarify what constitutes a designated employer. For the purpose of this
Act, designated employers are defined as employers employing 50 or more employ-
ees. Employers employing fewer than 50 employees, but with a total annual turnover
equal to or exceeding the applicable annual turnover of a ‘small business’, in terms of
a schedule in the Act, are designated as well. The annual turnover threshold of a small
business, according to the schedule, range from R2 million in the Agricultural sector
to R25 million in the sector of Wholesale Trade, Commercial Agents and Allied Serv-
ices. An employer can also be a designated employer by being bound by a collective
agreement, which appoints it as a designated employer in terms of the Employment
Equity Act. All municipalities and organs of state, with a few exceptions, are also con-
sidered to be designated employers.188
An employee is defined as any person, other than an independent contractor, who
works for another person and who receives, or is entitled to receive, any remunera-
tion and, in any manner, assists in carrying on or conducting the business of an em-
ployer.189 If a person’s services have been procured for, or are provided to a client by a
temporary employment service, for a indefinite duration or for a period of three
months or longer, that person is deemed to be an employee of that client as well.190
The Act can be divided into two main areas; (1) prohibition of discrimination in em-
ployment and (2) implementation of Affirmative Action measures.
9.1.1 Prohibition of Unfair Discrimination
All employers are required to take steps to promote equal opportunity in the work-
place. This shall be done by eliminating unfair discrimination in all employment poli-
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cies and practices.191 The definition of employment policy or practice, given in the
first chapter of the Act, is extensive:
“Employment policy or practice includes, but is not limited to--
a. recruitment procedures, advertising and selection criteria;
b. appointments and the appointment process;
c. job classification and grading:
d. remuneration, employment benefits and terms and conditions of employment;
e. job assignments;
f. the working environment and facilities;
g. training and development;
h. performance evaluation systems;
i. promotion;
j. transfer;
k. demotion;
l. disciplinary measures other than dismissal; and
m. dismissal.”192
Further, the Act prohibits unfair discrimination. No person may unfairly “discrimi-
nate, directly or indirectly, against an employee, in any employment policy or prac-
tice, on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status,
family responsibility, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability,
religion, HIV status, conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, language and
birth.”193 Harassment of an employee is judged as unfair discrimination as well. All
these protective regulations also apply to applicants for employment.194
The Employment Equity Act prohibits unfair discrimination. This can seem to con-
tradict with the affirmative action measures that are imposed by the Act. To avoid this
to become an issue, the Act states that measures taken in pursuit of affirmative action
do not constitute unfair discrimination.195
9.1.2 Affirmative Action
Every designated employee must implement affirmative action measures for people
from designated groups in order to achieve employment equity. An employer that is
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not a designated employer may notify the Director-General of the Department of La-
bour, that it intends to voluntary comply with the Act as if it were a designated em-
ployer.196
Affirmative action measures are defined as “measures designed to ensure that suita-
bly qualified people from designated groups have equal employment opportunities
and are equally represented in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce
of designated employer.”197
Section 15 (2) is one of the most central ones in the Act, it reads as follows:
“Affirmative action measures implemented by a designated employer must include--
a. measures to identify and eliminate employment barriers, including unfair dis-
crimination, which adversely affect people from designated groups;
b. measures designed to further diversity in the workplace based on equal dignity
and respect for all people;
c. making reasonable accommodation for people from designated groups in order to
ensure that they enjoy equal opportunities and are equitably represented in the
workforce of a designated employer;
d. subject to subsection (3), measures to--
 i. ensure the equitable representation of suitably qualified people from desig-
nated groups in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce; and
 ii. retain and develop people from designated groups and to implement appro-
priate training measures …”
An important clarification regarding the measures referred to in subsection (2) (d)
above is that they include preferential treatment and numerical goals, but exclude
quotas.198
Further, nothing in the section above, section 15, “requires a designated employer to
take any decision concerning an employment policy or practice that would establish
an absolute barrier to the prospective or continued employment or advancement of
people who are not from designated groups.”199
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In addition to the factors stated in section 15, the following aspects are taken into ac-
count when determining whether a designated employer is implementing employ-
ment equity in compliance with the Employment Equity Act:
“a.     The extent to which suitably qualified people from and amongst the different
designated groups [black people, women and people with disabilities] are equitably
represented within each occupation category and level in that employer’s
workforce in relation to the--
 i. demographic profile of the national and regional economically active
population;
 ii. pool of suitably qualified people from designated groups from which the
employer may reasonably be expected to promote or appoint employees;
 iii. economic and financial factors relevant to the sector in which the em-
ployer operates;
 iv. present and anticipated economic and financial circumstances of the em-
ployer; and
 v. the number of present and planned vacancies that exist in the various
categories and levels, and the employer’s labour turnover;
b. progress made in implementing employment equity by other designated employ-
ers operating under comparable circumstances and within the same sector;
c. reasonable efforts made by a designated employer to implement its employment
equity plan;
d. the extent to which the designated employer has made progress in eliminating
employment barriers that adversely affect people from designated groups; and
e. any other prescribed factor.”200
For the purpose of the Act, it is stated that a person may be suitably qualified for a job
as a result of that person’s formal qualifications, prior learning, relevant experience
or capacity to acquire, within a reasonable time, the ability to do the job. When de-
termining whether a person is suitably qualified, the employer must determine
whether the person has the ability to do the job in terms of any one of, or any combi-
nation of these factors. In making this decision, an employer may not discriminate
against a person solely on the ground of a person’s lack of relevant experience.201
The affirmative action measures shall ensure that suitably qualified people from des-
ignated groups have equal employment opportunities and are equitably represented
                                                          
200 Employment Equity Act, chapter 5 section 42
© Engdahl & Hauki 2001 59
in all occupational categories in the workforce. For this purpose designated employ-
ers must conduct analysis of employment barriers, which adversely affect people from
designated groups. This shall be done in consultation with all their employees,
through their trade union, or, in the absence of a union, with representatives nomi-
nated by the employees. Employment barriers can for instance be found in employ-
ment policies, practices, procedures or in the work environment. In order to deter-
mine the degree of under-representation of people from designated groups in various
occupational categories and levels, this analysis of employment barriers must include
a profile of the designated employer’s workforce within each occupational category
and level.202
9.1.3 Employment Equity Plan
One of the tools used for achieving equity on the labour market is the employment
equity plan that all designated employers must prepare and implement. The employ-
ment equity plan is meant to secure reasonable progress towards employment equity
in the employer’s workforce.
The plan shall be prepared in consultation with the employees, in the same manner as
described above. Implementation of the employment equity plan shall be discussed,
as well as an annual report on the progress made in the implementation of this plan.
The report shall include a statement on the remuneration and benefits received in
each occupational category and level of the employer’s workforce. The report is to be
sent to the Director-General of the Department of Labour, and public companies
must publish a summary of the report in their annual financial report.203
The equity plan must state the objectives to be achieved and what affirmative action
measures that are to be implemented by the employer for each year of the plan. If un-
der-representation of people from designated groups has been identified by the
analysis, numeric goals, a timetable and the strategies to achieve equitable represen-
tation shall be stated. The plan shall also include a timetable for achievement of goals
and objectives other than numeric goals.204
The plan shall state procedures and responsible persons to monitor and evaluate both
the implementation of the plan and whether reasonable progress is being made to-
wards implementing employment equity. The internal procedures to resolve any dis-
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putes regarding the plan shall also be stated. The duration of each Equity plan should
be for a period of no less than a year and no longer than five years.205
All employers, not only the designated ones, have a duty to display a notice informing
its employees of the provisions of the Employment Equity Act. The designated em-
ployers must also display the most recent report submitted to the Director-General of
the Department of Labour.206
9.1.4 Enforcement
A Commission for Employment Equity, with representatives of various interests such
as labour, business etc, is established by the Act. Among other functions, the Com-
mission is to advise the Minister of Labour regarding the issuance of codes of good
practice, regulations, policies and other matter concerning this Act.207
Labour Inspectors have authority to enter, question and inspect any workplace or any
other place where an employer carries on business or keeps employment records. If
the inspectors have reasonable grounds to believe that the employer has failed to
comply with the Act, they can request a written undertaking from a designated em-
ployer. If the employer refuses to make this written undertaking, or fails to comply
with it, the Labour Inspectors may issue a compliance order. Should the designated
employer not follow the compliance order, the Director-General may apply to the La-
bour Court to make it an order of the court.208
The Director-General may also conduct a review to determine whether an employer is
complying with the Act. In doing so, he can request the employer to submit different
records and request a meeting with an employer, employee or trade union. Failure to
comply with requests or recommendations by the Director-Generals can be referred
to the Labour Court.209
Disputes concerning unfair discrimination shall be referred to CCMA, the Commis-
sion for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration. If the dispute remains unsolved af-
ter conciliation, any of the parties in the dispute may refer it to the Labour Court for
adjudication. The dispute may also be solved through arbitration if the parties are
consent.210 If the Labour Court decides that an employer has unfairly discriminated
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against an employee, the Court may make any appropriate order that it finds just and
equitable. This may include payment of compensation and damages by the employer
to the employee, an order to the employer to take steps to prevent the same unfair
discrimination or a similar practice occurring in the future or directing an employer
who is not a designated employer to comply with the Act as if the employer was des-
ignated.211
The burden of proof is placed on the employer, who has to justify any action that is
alleged to be unfair discrimination.212
The Labour Court has power to, among other sanctions, award compensation and
damages in any circumstances contemplated in the Act, order compliance and impose
fines for contravention of certain provisions of the Act.213 The fines range from R500
000 for the first contravention to R900 000 for four previous contraventions in re-
spect of the same provision within three years.214
Critique on the Law
The Employment Equity Act are by some critics regarded as a “… new version of
statutory discrimination …”215 The Act has been accused of re-introducing the abomi-
nated principles used by the former ruling nationalist party government, such as job
reservation, re-introduction of racial classification and discrimination on a massive
scale.216
Critics against the affirmative action aspect of the Employment Equity Act have
claimed that the Act will lower standards on the workforce. This criticism is opposed
by others who mean that the Act does not oblige any employer to appoint anyone who
is not suitably qualified, and standards will therefore not be lowered by affirmative
action. Throughout the Act the term ‘suitable qualified people’ is used to describe an
applicant’s suitability for the job. The term is thoroughly explained in the Act, as pre-
viously described, and the essence of it is that an employer may not turn an applicant
down solely on the ground that he or she lacks formal qualification for the job. If a
person has the ability to do or learn to do the job, then he or she shall be taken for
qualified.
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From this the conclusion can be made that employers will not have to employ people
that are not qualified to do the job, but they might have to employ job applicants that
are not the most merited ones in order to meet the objectives in their employment
equity plan. From the perspective that the most merited ones might be passed in or-
der to achieve equitable representation in the workforce, standards can be seen as
lowered.
Another argument from critics against affirmative action is that the Act introduces
quotas, fixed targets and keeps focus on race. This criticism can be dismissed as the
Act explicitly excludes quotas to be used. Nor does the law require fixed targets. Each
workplace sets its own targets, after consultation with employees and trade unions.
When targets are set the circumstances of each workplace must be taken into account,
together with the demographic profile, pool of suitable qualified people, economic
circumstances of the employer etc. (Please see above for further information). In this
the Act allows for flexibility.
It is true that Affirmative Action keeps focus on race, but the negative aspect of this is
generally considered to be outweighed by the great need for affirmative action. It can
also be noted that affirmative action includes all but white non-handicapped men,
approximately 7% of the population.217
9.2 Skills Development Act (No 97 of 1998)
The Skills Development Act provides an institutional framework to devise and im-
plement national, sector and workplace strategies to develop and improve the skills of
the South African workforce.218
The purpose of the Act is to increase the levels of investment in education and train-
ing of the labour force, to improve the employment prospects of persons previously
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination and to redress the disadvantages through
training and education. Employers shall be encouraged to use the workplace as an
active learning environment, to provide the employees with the opportunities to ac-
quire new skills, to provide opportunities for new entrants to the labour market to
gain work experience and to employ persons who find it difficult to find employ-
ment.219
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The definition of an employee in this Act is the same as in the Employment Equity
Act. A worker is defined as an employee, an unemployed person or a work-seeker.220
The Act establishes the National Skills Authority and the National Skills Fund and
provides for the establishment of Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs).
The functions of the National Skills Authority are, among others, to advice the Min-
ister of Labour (the Minister) on regulations to be made, to liase with SETA on differ-
ent skills development policies and strategies, to conduct investigations and report on
the progress made in the implementation of the national skills development strategy.
Members of the Authority are appointed by the Minister to represent interests from
labour, business, the community and development interests as well as the State.221
There are several Sector Education and Training Authorities, 24 at the moment.222
They are set up for specific economic sectors, determined by the education and
training needs of employers and employees in similar categories of businesses. The
potential for coherent occupational structures and career planning as well as the fi-
nancial and organisational ability of the proposed sector to support a SETA are other
issues taken into consideration.223
The function of a SETA is to develop and implement a Sector Skills Plan by estab-
lishing learnerships, approve workplace skills plans, allocate grants to employees,
employers and education and training providers, and monitor education and training
in the sector. Furthermore, they are to collect and disburse the Skills Development
Levies (described below) in their sector. The SETAs are to liase with the National
Skills Authority and report to the Director-General of Labour. Every SETA consists of
representatives from labour, employers and relevant government departments and
might also include other interested parties if the Minister of Labour considers it ap-
propriate.224
Employers may develop a Skills Programme for their workforce and can thereafter
apply to their SETA for a grant or the Director-General of Labour for a subsidy. A
Skills Programme is defined as a programme that is occupationally based, will con-
stitute a credit towards a qualification registered in terms of the National Qualifica-
tion Framework when completed, uses training provider accredited by a body con-
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templated in the South African Qualifications Authority Act or complies with the pre-
scribed requirements.225
9.2.1 Enforcement
For monitoring and enforcement of the Act, Labour Inspectors have authority to con-
duct inspections, enter workplaces and any other place where an employer carries on
business or keeps employment records, require information disclosure, copy records,
issue compliance orders etc. Permissible fines that may be imposed for failure to
comply with the Act, not involving underpayment, range from R100 to R500 per em-
ployee, depending on whether there are previous failures to comply with the same
provision within 3 years.226
The Labour Court has jurisdiction in respect of matters arising from the Act. It con-
stitutes an offence to obstruct or attempt to influence improperly a person who is
performing a function in terms of the Act, to obtain or attempt to obtain any pre-
scribed documents by means of fraud, false pretences or by submitting a false or
forged prescribed document, or to knowingly furnish false information. The penalty
for a person convicted of an offence ranges from fines to imprisonment for a period
not exceeding one year.227
9.3 Skills Development Levies Act (No 9 of 1999)
The Skills Development Levies Act provides for the imposition of a skills development
levy on employers. All employers with very few exceptions must pay this levy. For in-
stance, if the total amount of remuneration paid or payable by a employer to all its
employees does not exceed R250 000 during the following 12 months and that the
employer is not required to apply for registration as an employer according to the In-
come Tax Act, then the levy does not have to be paid. Religious or charitable institu-
tions do not have to pay the levy, either. The levy is 1% of the leviable amount, by
which is meant the total amount of remuneration, paid or payable, or deemed to be
paid or payable, by an employer to its employees during every month. Pension, su-
perannuation allowance, retiring allowance etc shall not be included in the leviable
amount.228
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Every employer who is liable to pay the levy must register for the payment of the levy
with the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service and indicate within
which Sector Education and Training Authority the employer is to be classified.229
The collected levies, penalties and interests are paid into the National Revenue Fund.
20% of the collected amount is allocated in the National Skills Found, established by
the Skills Development Act, and the rest, 80%, is distributed to the relevant SETAs
that the employers have indicated on the registration form.230 The money in the fund
is to be used in projects identified in the National Skills Development Strategy as na-
tional priorities.231
If the skills development levy is not paid in due time, a penalty of 10 per cent of the
unpaid amount is payable in addition to interest.232
Similar to the Employment Equity Act, Labour Inspectors are used to monitor and
enforce the compliance with the Act. They may, without warrant or notice, enter any
workplace or other place, which is not a home, where an employer carries on business
or keeps any records. By consent of the owner or occupier, or by a warrant, the in-
spectors may enter a home and any other place as well. The Labour Inspectors may
require persons to disclose information under oath or affirmation, inspect and take
copies of any document of interest regarding this Act, require producing of docu-
ments and perform any other prescribed function necessary for collection of the levy.
They may issue compliance orders as well.233
Any person who fails to apply for registration, pay the levy, knowingly furnishes false
information, or fails to submit or deliver documents, disclose information, attend and
give information, hinders or obstructs any person in carrying out his or her functions
in terms of the Act, commits an offence. A fine or imprisonment for a period not ex-
ceeding one year is the sanction on conviction. The burden of proof that the informa-
tion supplied by the employer in statements is accurate is put on the employer.234
9.3.1 Disbursement of Grants
The intention of the Skills Development Act and Skills Development Levy is to
stimulate skills development by enabling employers to reclaim some expenditure on
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skills development initiatives. The disbursement of grants is proportional to the levy
that has been paid by the employer.235 There are several levels of grants, with differ-
ent requirements to be fulfilled. The relevant SETA has further information on this.
A SETA may also pay a grant towards the cost of a learnership, and pay an allowance
to learners at workplaces.236
10 CONCLUSIVE REFLECTIONS
Introduction
In this chapter we will describe and analyse some attitudes and problems connected
to black economic empowerment. Focus will be on affirmative action, window-
dressing and skill shortage.
10.1 General Aspects
The optimists of BEE claim that there has never been such a speedy transfer of eco-
nomic assets from one racial group to another in the history of world economy. At the
same time, pessimists claim that black economic empowerment seems more like a
sham. One black businessman has described it as a huge con job: “The financial in-
stitutions have only leased these assets to us. They will soon be coming back to re-
claim possession of what is theirs.”237
Economic growth, or the lack thereof, is often discussed at the same time as black
economic empowerment. Some argue that economic growth will be achieved only if
government policies regarding affirmative action, general redress and equality are re-
pealed and if, by extension, business is allowed to pursue profit without hindrance.
Others argue that it will be achieved only if the previously marginalised persons are
roped into the mainstream and redistribution of wealth is taking place. There are
many aspects to both these opinions. What one must keep in mind is that affirmative
action, and other legislation that is criticised, are there to change the economic com-
plexion of the country and deepen the democracy, by ensuring that black people take
part in creating the country’s growth and shaping its future.238 Hence, the question is
not only whether empowerment generates growth more than growth would deliver
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empowerment. It is a question of democracy, getting rid of the yoke of apartheid and
of fulfilling the expectations that was created by the election manifesto and the new
democratic order.
The efficient functioning of the market in South Africa is described to be distorted by
racism, which remains fundamentally ingrained across all sectors of the society. Out
of this perspective, black economic empowerment is believed to be necessary in order
to create a non-racist, efficiently functioning market.239
The government of South Africa regards black economic empowerment not only as an
instrument to achieve empowerment for the historically disadvantaged individuals
(HDIs), but also as a tool to integrate the South African society into the surrounding
global environment. To be competitive on the international market, it is not feasible
to have the majority of the population outside the economy. Human capital and en-
trepreneurship are crucial for a country’s competitiveness, especially in the new
economy. Out of this aspect, empowerment is not only a matter of equity, it is a mat-
ter of South Africa’s survival in the global context.240
Critics often take the view that black economic empowerment has resulted in black
enrichment instead of empowerment. Enrichment has and is certainly taking place,
which is why black economic empowerment sometimes is said to be working only in
favour of those who wants to be ‘filthy rich’ and do not care about the rest of the soci-
ety. This view is opposed by others arguing that despite the flaws, which were mostly
connected to the first generation of empowerment, black success stories have had an
important psychological role for the black community. The success of some black
businessmen have inspired the rest of the black population and dispelled the illusion
that business success is a whites’ phenomenon only.241
The instant achievers have served as role models in this evolution. You have to start
somewhere. Total dismissal of black economic empowerment because a few people
have enriched themselves in the beginning of the process is harsh. Black economic
empowerment aims at changing the conditions for living for the big masses in South
Africa, which is a process that needs time to give result.
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You have to bear in mind that the first few years after the democratic elections were
coloured by private companies eager to attain a politically correct ownership struc-
ture. These first empowerment operations had no regulatory guidance from the gov-
ernment side. For example, it took a long time before the government issued clear
empowerment criteria for the procurement procedures that the companies could fol-
low. Thus, the empowerment that took place during the first years was not controlled
by the government and can therefore not be taken as evidence of that the govern-
ment’s empowerment endeavours only work for the few.
The past years can be seen as a learning period for the government. The South Afri-
can government is regarded as good at creating policies but not as good at imple-
menting them. They need to walk the talk, as someone has expressed it. The govern-
ment has received heavy criticism for the lack of monitoring of its various pro-
grammes. To evaluate the effect, or lack thereof, of different programmes and initia-
tives is almost impossible due to the lack of adequate statistics.
The informal sector in the country is large. This is caused by the inherited apartheid
system and creates several problems for the new government. Many people are not in
the registers, they have no permanent address and they earn too little money to pay
tax. The tax base in South Africa is only about 30 percent.
One problem in the new South Africa is the co called ‘expectation problem’ - the
growing disillusionment and anger of the millions of Africans who expected that their
problems would vanish once political freedom was achieved and the apartheid system
was defeated. For this group of people the process has been too slow. At the same
time, the change has been perceived to be too fast and is seen as a threat by those who
were previously advantaged.242 White people have fears and black people have ex-
pectations. This puts the government in a very tough position. The black population
constitutes the majority of voters, whereas the white population represents most of
the economic power in the country. In order to succeed both as a government and
with black economic empowerment, the government needs support from the whole
population. The government has a difficult role in trying to balance the different in-
terests. It is essential that the capacity of the whites remains in South Africa, as well
as it is essential that those previously disadvantaged are advanced as quickly as pos-
sible. Therefore, the government, and the corporate world, have to find a way to ad-
vance the disadvantaged, seemingly at no cost to the advantaged. This needs to be
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done in a time period during which the disadvantaged will not lose patience, but at
the same time at a rate that will retain tolerance among the advantaged. South Af-
rica’s future may be determined by how well this balancing act is handled by the
government.243
Political freedom for all South Africans was gained by the first democratic elections in
1994. Black economic empowerment aims at achieving economical freedom. The gov-
ernment is believed to have underestimated the challenging process from political
freedom to economical freedom.
Black economic empowerment is an enormous task for the government to take on.
One has to keep in mind that the previous government provided for only 13 percent of
the population and the present government provides for 100 percent of the popula-
tion. The nature of the South African economy has been described as “’[i]t is premised
on the view, and has been for the last 100 years, that a modern industrial economy
can be run effectively by 5 percent of the population for the benefit and advancement
of 12.8 percent of the population while ignoring the other 87 percent.’”244
While the income gap between whites and blacks has narrowed, there is now a grow-
ing gap between the earnings of high- and low-income black people. Thereby, the po-
litical debate has increasingly changed from being a race issue to a class issue.
Legislation created in order to achieve black economic empowerment keeps the focus
on race. Some people, who mean that it constitutes reverse racism and is based on the
same methods as the abolished apartheid system, see this as negative. Nevertheless,
to remedy a racial issue, the same tools need to be used if results are to be achieved
within a reasonable time. A system that recognises the history for what it is, is needed
in order to correct it. There are huge inequalities in South Africa, due to its rasistic
history. It would be naive to say that all groups of people are on the same level now
that the statutory discrimination has been repealed.
The government implements black economic empowerment legislation and policies
with the ambition to create a non-racial society. To address a problem through legis-
lative measures may have the opposite effect than was intended, though. The problem
becomes more of a legislative issue, which can dampen the public debate. By setting
legal requirements on a certain level, there is also a risk for a minimum approach. If
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the law says x percent, x percent is what will be performed and nothing more. Pres-
sure, as well as incentives, through legislation is the only feasible option to secure re-
sults in certain areas. If the accomplishment of black empowerment would be left to
the market, the process would be too slow. It is wishful thinking to believe that the
market would make a speedy correction of itself out of moral beliefs or a sense of so-
cial responsibility.
South Africa’s history of apartheid is still close by. People, both black and white, have
practically lived their whole lives segregated and under different conditions and pos-
sibilities. It takes a lot of courage and willingness to re-evaluate your view of the
world that you have been fostered into. Time is needed - perceptions and mind-sets
could need generations to change.
10.2 Affirmative Action
In South Africa, affirmative action takes place in what once was the most structured
racist society in the world, now in the process of deracialisation. This makes the char-
acter of affirmative action in South Africa unique compared to affirmative action that
has taken place elsewhere. Rather than aiming to create opportunities for a minority,
as it is usually used for, affirmative action in South Africa aims at transforming an
economy that for many years barred the majority of the population from any mean-
ingful role.
Affirmative action is resented by some of the beneficiaries of the previously legislated
advantages. They consider it to be reverse racial discrimination, contradicting the
ANC promise of colour-blind non-racialism. While the ANC government views more
equitable representation through affirmative action policies as a precondition for suc-
cessful nation-building, opponents perceive the policy of affirmative action as un-
dermining national reconciliation.245
White young people of today sometimes claim that they have to bear the burden of
the historical wrongs against the black population. The purpose of affirmative action
is not to punish those who were privileged in the apartheid system, but to admit that
many people are wrongfully excluded from several areas in the society due to sup-
pression and denial of equal opportunities in the past. Affirmative action is a way to
address and come to terms with this in an active way. The fact is that almost all white
people, regardless their attitude to racism, benefited from the institutional racism
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that was practised in South Africa. White South Africans need to accept that racism
was not eradicated by the new dispensation, that it still is embedded in the country’s
society and needs to be addressed.246 It is easy to hold the view that bygones should
be bygones if you are from the privileged group.
During the first phase of empowerment parallel positions were created; Black people,
without the qualifications needed, were recruited to managerial positions, while white
people continued to run the business. This was done to open doors for government
contracts or to score public relations points. The use of parallel positions has led to
the misconception that affirmative action is about putting incompetent black people
in positions they cannot handle. This kind of conduct does not constitute true af-
firmative action. The essence of affirmative action is to recognise the people who have
suitable ability and training, and assist them in gaining positions in business life that
they were previously denied.247
A negative effect of affirmative action may be that it could lead to a perception of en-
titlement among the previously disadvantaged. They do not see that they still have to
shape their own future, rather they expect the new system to deliver it to them. This
creates a lot of frustration. Another downside is that affirmative action is said to
stigmatise the beneficiaries of affirmative action, by implying that they cannot com-
pete on equal basis. People in the affirmative action category may come to question
their value and wonder if they succeeded on their own merit, or whether their sex or
race explains their success. The assumption of being a product of affirmative action is
likely to be applied to all blacks that have attained positions, whether it would be with
or without the aid of affirmative action.248
In the interviews we conducted in South Africa, we raised the issue of whether af-
firmative action measures should have a so-called sunset clause, limiting the time for
using affirmative action. Its termination could either be set by a timeframe or be
linked to the achievements of certain goals. Most people we met reject this idea,
whereas some people think that it might be good in that the government would have
to play with open cards regarding its full objectives. The latter group thinks that the
introduction of a sunset clause could slow down the brain-drain from South Africa
and to a certain extent open for a more foreseeable political situation. At the same
time, if the new government in 1994 would have introduced for example an employ-
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ment equity programme with a sunset clause, stating certain levels that had to be
achieved within a specific time period, most white South Africans are believed to have
protested and moved away. As it happened, the process allowed changes to slowly
sink into peoples’ minds over time. Subsequently, most white South Africans have
come to accept the affirmative action process.
An introduction of a sunset clause is knowingly not on the government’s agenda to-
day, but it can be interesting to speculate on the effect such a clause would have on
the process. The need for a time frame has to be based on the assumption that af-
firmative action seriously affects the possibilities for white persons, though.
10.3 Window-Dressing
Window-dressing, fronting and rent-a-black, are all definitions of the same kind of
conduct, namely when black business-people are lending their faces and fronting for
white businesses. They are invited at equity level to give the company an artificial
black empowerment profile. This creates a lot of problems. Most often the black
shareholder does not get involved at operational level. The business is still run by
white managers, which means that there is no managerial skills transfer to blacks.
The biggest damage is made as companies that practice window-dressing compete
with real black empowerment companies under the empowerment banner. The black
entrepreneurs, who most often are operating under tougher conditions than the white
businesses, are the big losers.249 It is completely undermining the affirmative pro-
curement policies and other empowerment ambitions designed to develop black op-
erational capacity and economic growth.
10.3.1 Why do Companies Practise Window-Dressing?
When you look into the reasons why companies practise window-dressing, many ex-
planations are given. One is that empowerment is seen as a pure cost. Money decides
and window-dressing will therefore happen as long as you can get away with it. An-
other reason is lack of time. There is time pressure to make the management level
look good. Sometimes window-dressing is said to occur because it is hard to find
professional black people.
Those who oppose these arguments mean that window-dressing is an evidence of
white companies attempts to exploit and circumvent empowerment regulations out of
reluctance to transfer economical power to black people. From this perspective, pure
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racism is the ground. The argument that professional blacks are hard to find is coun-
tered by the argument that companies do not look in the right places. Companies are
blamed for lacking dedication and for not putting efforts in to find suitable qualified
people as affirmative action employees. The thinking is believed to be more of ‘we
need a black face, lets get it over and done with’. There is also a suspicion that com-
panies willingly employ incompetent black people to prove that affirmative action
does not work.
The focus on equity ownership during the first phase of empowerment made window-
dressing a lucrative and relatively easy way to acquire the needed empowerment
status. In today’s South Africa window-dressing will become expensive in the long
run, at least if the company is labour intense. The new labour legislation puts a
growing number of requirements on companies to employ historically disadvantaged
individuals. Meeting these requirements by creating parallel positions is costly.
Window-dressing would not exist without black people willing to participate in that
kind of conduct. The reasons for their participation are several. One of the major rea-
sons is, of course, the common human desire for fast and easy money. Added to this,
many of the so-called historically disadvantaged individuals feel entitlement. They
have been excluded and deprived for so long and cannot wait to get wealthy. The ones
that have got a job may be exposed to huge financial pressure from the extended
families and feel responsibility to take care of them.
Historically disadvantaged individuals that have acted as front figures have been dis-
credited and accused of being disloyal to the rest of the community. To refer to moral
obligation as a reason not to participate in window-dressing is naive. It takes a lot to
turn lucrative offers down. If there are business opportunities, most people would
take them. One can also wonder why the black peoples’ business operations should be
more steered by moral obligations than others’.
10.3.2 Governments Role in Window-Dressing
The government can partly be blamed for the window-dressing that has occurred. Or-
ganisations that are created in a certain system will reflect the opportunities provided
by the institutional framework in that system. If piracy is rewarded, then piratical or-
ganisations will come into existence.250 The practice of window-dressing and alike
conducts has been possible since the government’s monitoring of empowerment is
weak. The intention is there, and some state entities’ monitoring practices are better
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than others’. Still, there is room for companies to have a superficial empowerment
profile.251 Trade and Industry Minister Alec Erwin has admitted that the government
has not been sufficiently well organised and co-ordinated to ensure a systematic im-
plementation of the programmes for affirmative procurement, and agrees that a great
deal of work still has to be done to co-ordinate the various government depart-
ments.252
The government has also been accused for acting hypocritically at times. When ac-
quiring goods and services the government wants the job to be done by an
empowerment company, at the same time as they require the job to be done fast and
with major resources. As empowerment companies often lack the resources and expe-
riences needed, especially for larger contracts, a white firm, with a subcontract or a
joint venture with an empowerment company, is therefore contracted to take full re-
sponsibility for the job. Thus, the government is said to exclude the empowerment
companies from the bidding scene through its requirements on the bidders’ opera-
tional capacity.
10.4 Skills Shortage
As a result of the apartheid educational system, the market of well-educated black
South Africans is not only small, but also skewed. For example, there is a significant
lack of black people with technical degrees. Due to the demand on black profession-
als, fully trained black people are much more expensive than their white counter-
parts. The very active headhunting industry creates problems for companies that put
time and money into training staff.253
This affects the government as well. South Africa’s Finance Minister Trevor Manuel
has claimed that black professionals are pricing themselves out of the economy and
that the government finds it difficult to deliver services because the skills needed
from black people are unaffordable.254
The so-called epidemic of job-hopping by blacks is not only caused by headhunting,
some argue. Many black people are said not to leave because of a better offer but out
of frustration. Colleagues that are afraid of interacting with them, feelings of aliena-
tion, distrust in their ability, difficulties to reach their full potential or to advance
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within their organisation are issues that are far more often said to be the reason for
job hopping.255
The skills shortage is also caused by ‘brain drain’. Many well-educated white people
have left the country in the last years. Statistics are poor and therefore different num-
bers and reasons for the brain drain are presented. Many white people are said to
have left out of fear for what would follow after the political changes in the country in
1994. The high crime rate, declining standards and services and the turbulence in the
educational system are other reasons given. Some are said to leave for the sake of
their children - they do not believe that they will have a good future in South Africa.
Some people think that white South Africans leave due to racism. The individualistic
culture among western people is also said to be the reason for white South Africans to
leave. Furthermore, white people are believed to be leaving since they are not getting
the same privileges as during the time of apartheid. On the other hand, others argue
that brain-drain in South Africa is overplayed and is more of a threat than an event.
When you discuss brain-drain, you have to keep in mind that we live in an increas-
ingly globalised world with mobility of people, capital and technology. It is an inter-
national trend that people with globally accepted higher degrees are more mobile
than ever before. What is viewed as brain-drain in South Africa can probably partly be
explained as a natural consequence of the country’s newly acquired acceptance in the
world society.
11 FUTURE
Introduction
In this chapter, we will discuss the future prospects of black economic empowerment.
The chapter is based on our interviews, debates in the media, as well as our own view
on the future course of black economic empowerment.
11.1 The Future of Black Economic Empowerment
There are indications of a shift towards a new phase of empowerment. The waterline
between the second and third phase of empowerment may spring from the recently
released, long-awaited BEE Commission’s report on the present state and future of
black economic empowerment.
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Year 2000 saw the value of empowerment deals on the JSE slide back to same levels
as in 1996.256 With unemployment among young black South Africans of about 40
percent and the black ownership on JSE estimated at less than 2 percent, it lies near
at hand to see black economic empowerment as a failure. Especially when, at the
same time, white South Africans, approximately 13 percent of the population, earn 44
percent of the country’s net income.257
All sides do not share this view, though. The people decrying the slow advancement of
BEE are blamed for seeing the transformation process too narrowly, ignoring the
progress made by unlisted companies and the development that has taken place in
the rural areas. To use a leading black businessman’s words, “BEE has not been a
failure. It has been a steep learning curve”.258
Irrespective of which standpoint you have, black economic empowerment is becom-
ing an increasingly significant political and economical issue in South Africa today.
Which way empowerment will take in the future is likely to be affected by the conclu-
sions and recommendations made by the BEE Commission. As earlier presented in
chapter 8, the BEE Commission advocates an interventionist strategy by the govern-
ment, and calls for comprehensive legislative measures to accelerate development.
Their view is supported by black businesses, which believe that South Africa might go
the Zimbabwe route if the right gear for empowerment is not found.259
The government has shown doubt to the BEE Commission’s strong reliance on the
government to lead the empowerment process. Therefore, we believe that a consider-
able shift in the government’s present role is not likely to follow. The government has
a strong belief that the existing legislative framework will prove to be sufficient to
serve the future empowerment process given adequate time.
When judging the progress of black economic empowerment up to date and giving
suggestions on the appropriate way forward, the complex reality where the first
empowerment initiatives were led off must be considered. Several good BEE initia-
tives came to nothing due to that the economical environment was not structurally
geared to accommodate them. At the time, there was no regulatory framework to
support and give structure to the process. When the framework started to be built, the
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objectives were not fully clarified, leading to some government strategies fighting
each other. It also deserves to be noticed that appropriate statistics still scarcely ex-
ists. Thus, the government lacks the basic tool for policy creation and evaluation.
With a newly introduced policy for the restructuring of State Owned Enterprises
(SOEs) and legislation for affirmative procurement, these two areas are likely to be
additionally emphasised in the future as the major deliverers of empowerment.
Therefore, the pressure on the market to enter equity relationships with black com-
panies in order to secure government contracts or ownership in restructured SOEs
will continue. This is likely to increase the number of joint ventures and equity trans-
actions between established firms and black companies.
The effect of the affirmative procurement policies will in the future not be limited to
companies that deal directly with the state. Companies that have business with the
state will be asked to show that their own procurement has a strong affirmative ele-
ment. These requirements will put pressure on the companies’ suppliers to have an
appropriate empowerment status in order to secure contracts. As discussed in chapter
5.2.4, this is already the case in several SOEs. Therefore, companies with no direct
business contact with the state also have to conform to the state’s affirmative pro-
curement regulations.260
In order to uniform and facilitate the evaluation of a company’s empowerment status
it is possible that the government will carry out the BEE Commission’s recommenda-
tions on how to define a black, black empowered, black influenced and engendered
company. However, the BEE Commission’s proposal keeps the focus on equity own-
ership as a determining factor for a company’s empowerment status. It is believed
that, in the future, the empowerment status of a company will be determined by the
composition of the company board and executive leadership, together with commit-
ments and actions that conform to an empowerment profile, rather than the com-
pany’s shareholder base.261
The decreasing concentration on equity ownership that was seen during the second
phase of empowerment is believed to continue. It is argued that the big masses can-
not earn their living as shareholders, wherefore the government’s focus should be
kept in areas where significant results can be achieved, namely education and job
creation.
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The lack of access to financing is expected to continue to be the major obstacle for
empowerment. Financial institutions are blamed for constituting the least trans-
formed sector in South Africa and for not showing enough commitment to the appar-
ently needed transformation of the society. The financial institutions dismiss the
criticism with the motivation that they treat applications objectively and that their
exposure for international competition hinders them from applying specific criteria
for financing of empowerment activities. However objectively an application for a
loan may be treated, financiers are asking for earlier business records, experience and
securities, requirements that people who have been excluded from the economical
sphere until recently hardly can meet. Consequently, the result is based on race and
has the effect that it is very hard for black entrepreneurs to be granted financial
means.
State driven financing initiatives have been introduced during the years to improve
the empowerment companies’ scarce access to capital. The results have thus far not
fulfilled the expectations, and the government’s financing programmes have been
blamed for involving too much politics. It is increasingly argued that the private sec-
tor’s contribution is needed in order to address the problem.
12 RECOMMENDATIONS TO COMPANIES
Introduction
We hope that this Thesis has been successful in conveying the essence of the complex
transformation process taking place in South Africa. To make an elaborate study of
black economic empowerment in a paper of this extent is not feasible, nor has it been
our aim. We trust that the paper has helped to increase the reader’s awareness of the
importance to have a well thought-out BEE strategy for business operations in South
Africa.
In this concluding chapter we will discuss the importance of choosing the right
empowerment partner, BEE as a business imperative and transformation within the
company.
12.1 The Choice of an Empowerment Partner
For a company operating in South Africa that intends to do business with public enti-
ties, an empowerment partner is often needed. The most adapted judicial form for an
empowerment partnership must be decided out of every company’s own conditions,
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depending on the purpose, extent and permanency of the planned business opera-
tions in South Africa. Irrespective of the outer form for the collaboration, it is crucial
to choose the right empowerment partner in order to be successful in South Africa.
Before entering a partnership with an empowerment company, it is of outmost im-
portance to define for what purpose the collaboration is established, and to clearly
express the value that is expected from the empowerment partner. Thereby, it is pos-
sible to avoid an inappropriate structure for the partnership and disappointments re-
garding the levels of involvement, value added and skills transfer.262
In the debate regarding window-dressing, the argument is often brought forward that
it is difficult to find a suitable empowerment partner. This is probably the case in
fields involving for instance high technology, whereas in other fields we have been
told that the problem relates more to lack of commitment than to non-existence of
good empowerment partners. A company looking for an empowerment partner
should be conscious of the importance to devote time and resources to the selection
process, and not start business relations with the first empowerment company that it
gets in contact with.
When granting loans, financial institutions increasingly prefer empowerment compa-
nies, which have emerged from the bottom up – in other words, built an operational
business as opposed to merely acting as an investment holding company.263 In our
opinion, this approach is also recommendable for companies looking for an
empowerment partner. However, when evaluating empowerment companies’ experi-
ences and track records, it should be born in mind that all empowerment companies
are post-democratic. Companies that usually are classified as start-ups elsewhere can
in the South African context be regarded as established ones.
12.2 Black Economic Empowerment – a Business Imperative
As the preceding chapters have aimed to convey, black economic empowerment af-
fects all business operations in South Africa. The pressure to comply with the regula-
tory framework varies depending on the company size, field of business and the de-
gree of business relations with state entities, as well as how labour intense the busi-
ness is. The government has come a long way in laying the foundation and building a
sustainable structure for the empowerment process to proceed on, and is increasingly
challenging the business sector to embrace black economic empowerment.
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A company operating in South Africa decides its own approach in how to deal with
BEE regulations and programmes, and thereby the degree of its contribution to the
transformation process of the society. Since we do not consider non-compliance and
circumvention to be an alternative, we identify the following levels of commitments
for a company operating in South Africa:
·  Formal and correct compliance with the empowerment regulations
·  Active compliance with the empowerment regulations combined with voluntary
initiatives, for example compliance with Employment Equity Act without being a
so called designated employer (see chapter 9.1)
·  To embrace black economic empowerment as a business imperative
The first two approaches are sufficient if the purpose is to comply with the BEE regu-
lations, and to even show commitment to the process by active compliance. Whereas
if successful long-term operation in South Africa is a part of a company’s objectives,
we assert that black economic empowerment should not be seen as a matter of com-
plying with regulations and laws. It should constitute one of the company’s core
strategies.
12.2.1 Black Economic Empowerment as a Competitive Advantage
Conformity with black economic empowerment requirements will continue to grow in
importance in dealings with the government in South Africa, as the government is
emphasising black economic empowerment requirements in increasingly more as-
pects. As BusinessMap puts it; “[t]his presents established white-controlled domestic
and foreign businesses with a stark reality; conform or don’t bid for state busi-
ness…”.264
Companies who are dependent on contracts with state entities increasingly under-
stand the importance to show commitment to the empowerment process. This cannot
be said to be the case among companies with no direct business contact with the gov-
ernment or parastatals.
As discussed earlier in this paper, there are strong signs that the sphere of companies
affected by various empowerment requirements is becoming wider. Today these re-
quirements are put on the companies through government initiatives, but in the fu-
                                                                                                                                                                                      
263 BusinessMap 1999, p 8
264 BusinessMap 2000, p 13
© Engdahl & Hauki 2001 81
ture, we believe the major pressure to embrace black economic empowerment to
come from the market.
In the same way as international market forces today can condemn a company for
placing operations in countries with poor labour conditions or for neglecting envi-
ronmental aspects in the course of business, we believe that the ability to demonstrate
contribution to the transformation process will become crucial for a company’s suc-
cess in South Africa. Out of this perspective, the pressure will increase on companies
to be regarded as socially responsible businesses, by BusinessMap defined as organi-
sations that focus on their operation’s impact on their employees and their social and
environmental surroundings. This implies emphasis on concepts such as social
auditing and social accountability to measure the full empowerment impact of a com-
pany’s operations.265
Given the present lack of an unambiguous definition on the essence of empowerment
and the relatively early state of the transformation process, the awareness of the mar-
ket is most likely not to be expected in the near future. When the market’s awareness
has increased, we believe that the value of goodwill, bringing a competitive advan-
tage, will be considerable for companies that can demonstrate a history of firmly es-
tablished commitment to black economic empowerment. Especially as the future
buying power will emerge from people subject to empowerment today.
This competitive advantage is understood by several large companies that have
launched different social commitment programmes with elements of social invest-
ment through education, employment creation and community support. They also
promote small empowerment companies in their own procurement process through
affirmative procurement policies and form joint ventures with this category of com-
panies when taking part in public tender procedures.
12.3 Transformation within the Corporation
For a company seeking to develop black economic empowerment into one of its core
strategies, the transformation process has to begin within the organisation. A solid
starting point in this process is the understanding of the fact that the regulatory re-
quirements on a company’s diversity profile can lead to a positive result, if the com-
mitment is there. Instead of being regarded as a legal issue placing a threat of penalty
for non-compliance, we believe that true commitment to the essence of black eco-
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nomic empowerment should be regarded as a tool to liberate new capacity in the or-
ganisation, and therefore is decisive for the company’s future relevance on the mar-
ket.
The transformation of a company is not a process that solely can be lead from the
boardrooms. The concept of empowerment, and employment equity as a part of it,
has to be understood and supported throughout the organisation in order to reach
substance over mere form. It is therefore crucial to create a company culture that em-
braces and encourages empowerment.
12.3.1 The Importance of a Visionary Leader
The company leader’s role in creating the right company culture is indispensable. The
CEO, as well as the top management, is to drive and steer the development of
empowerment as a central business imperative. Without the leaders’ strong and visi-
ble commitment to the process, it will not be possible to reach unity behind the com-
pany’s empowerment objectives throughout the organisation.
Internal resistance to embrace black economic empowerment as a business impera-
tive is mostly found in the middle management. As their lack of enthusiasm can be
decisive of how the workforce perceives the process, sincere commitment at the mid-
dle manager level is to be ensured. One way to clarify the importance of BEE as the
company’s business imperative is to integrate links between management remunera-
tion and the performance they show in managing empowerment objectives.
Given the importance of a strong leader to drive the empowerment process within the
organisation, it is of outmost importance for a company establishing in South Africa
to appoint a visionary leader with a firm commitment to black economic
empowerment.
12.3.2 Diversity Management in the Company
As several South African workplaces are becoming more representative of the society,
the need for diversity management has been recognised and actively discussed the
last year within corporate South Africa. You should be aware of that diversity man-
agement is not about combining one white and one black culture within the organisa-
tion. There are several black, as well as white, cultures in South Africa that need to
learn how to collaborate in the workplace.
In workplaces where diversity management is neglected, the internal transformation
process can be restrained due to inherent reluctance to the process. The reluctance is
© Engdahl & Hauki 2001 83
most often an unconscious reaction, originating in fear for change. Diversity man-
agement aims at providing people with skills that enable them to deal with the trans-
formation of their organisation.
Workshops dealing with various related themes are often used as a part of a com-
pany’s diversity management. Their objective is to increase the knowledge of culture-
based peculiarities and thereby diminish scepticism towards values that might not
coincide with your own.
By changing the mind-sets, people can start to understand diversity and learn to ap-
preciate and respect it within their own organisation. Therefore, successful diversity
management is a vital part in impeding the pace of job-hopping, partly caused by in-
tolerant and uncomfortable workplaces. Other ways to help retain staff is to create job
assignments and working environments in a way that will develop and support the
individual’s performance. Mentorship programmes are useful tools as well.266
The process to develop all aspects of black economic empowerment to be business
imperatives requires knowledge and strong commitment. It can be perceived to take a
lot of time and resources from the ordinary business operation. You have to keep in
mind that economic empowerment of the previously disadvantaged is not about
charity. It is an investment. At the end of the day, to broaden the economic base to
comprise the society in its entirety makes business sense.
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